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ABSTRACT 
 Social scientists from different disciplines have various approaches to explaining 
phenomena such as why people behave as they do and why some organizations outperform 
their competition. However, the complexity of human and even firm behavior is perhaps better 
understood by combining the work from multiple fields and perspectives. For example, 
economists can explain differences in productivity using capital and labor, but psychologists can 
explain how to get more productivity out of the same labor. Indeed, economic models often 
notice “residual effects” when modeling firm performance, but they simply call them “managerial 
quality” and leave them inside the error term (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007). By incorporating 
psychology into economics, we have a chance to pull this additional “input” out of the error term 
so that our models can better explain why some firms are more productive or more profitable 
than their rivals.  
 Of course, other economists have also argued for the need to blend disciplines and take 
a multi-disciplinary approach to our usual problems. They argue that incorporating more realistic 
psychological findings and theories into the assumptions of economic models can be not only 
beneficial, but should be necessary to help us better predict the behaviors we observe in the 
real world. For example, feelings of reciprocity often lead to deviations from our models: people 
reciprocate unfairness (and altruism) in ways that may even lower their expected utility (see, for 
example, results of the “ultimatum game”). Along these same lines, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) 
looked at the relationships between firms and workers using the social exchange theory (which 
comes mainly from sociology or anthropology) and held that workers may reciprocate a higher 
wage with a higher effort. (This is different than the view of most economic theories, which hold 
that the effort or productivity comes first, and is rewarded with a wage equal to the worker’s 
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marginal contribution.) It can also be seen that psychology has aided our models from the work 
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who developed the ideas of reference-dependent 
preferences and loss aversion and improved standard models of risk behavior.  
Rabin (1998) argues that in general, economists understand that the assumptions we make 
before beginning our analyses are often unrealistic. However, he argues that some of these 
assumptions could be aided by incorporating what psychology has found to be true about 
people’s behaviors. As he puts it (pg 3):  
 
As messy as complicating our familiar model of humans will be… it is not legitimate for 
economics to continue to ignore psychological research…  Most importantly, we must abandon 
meta-arguments about whether it is "possible" that psychologists have identified economically 
relevant departures from rationality, self-interest, and other familiar assumptions. Of course it is 
possible, and in fact is true."  
 
 Thus, one goal of this research is to see whether the contributions of psychology to our 
models of individuals’ behaviors can be mirrored by contributions to our models of firms. If so, 
the reader will hopefully be convinced that while specialization allows each of us to be experts in 
our own fields, it’s the integration of fields that allows for the multi-lens perspectives that give us 
the best understanding of the highly complex realities of human and firm behavior. 
 Both essays of this dissertation take this approach, integrating psychology and 
management into economics to see if a greater understanding of differences in organizational 
performance and outcomes can be achieved. The first essay, Measuring the Effects of 
Management Humility and Employee Voice on Continual Improvement and Performance, 
focuses on what occurs inside the firm between managers and employees that may affect the 
firm’s ability to continually improve. This ability can be especially necessary in highly competitive 
industries where firms aren’t protected by barriers to entry and customers’ preferences are 
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constantly changing. However, the internal exchanges between employees and managers are 
often not modeled or included in our standard economic theories, even though they may be an 
integral component to the development and implementation of new ideas that could improve 
efficiency and firm performance. Specifically, in this research I will investigate whether certain 
managers are more likely to experience more input from employees and whether these same 
types of managers are more likely to implement new ideas to continually improve the way things 
are done. Additionally, I test whether this willingness to implement new ideas is also associated 
with higher perceived levels of efficiency. If this chain of events can help us better understand 
differences in firm performance, then perhaps we can enhance our models by measuring and 
including these internal firm characteristics (rather than leaving them inside the error term as 
“unobservable”). 
 In the second essay, I propose to test whether different organizations involved in 
heading anti-malaria campaigns (such as the World Bank, UNICEF, etc.) are having varying 
levels of success, defined by achieving levels of preventive behavior among their target 
populations.  If some organizations are both more efficient and more effective than others, then 
perhaps those that underperform can learn from and imitate the higher performers, and funding 
can be directed toward those organizations that use the money efficiently. In this way, the 
second essay differs from the first. The first essay takes as given that performance differs 
among organizations and seeks to understand why, but the second investigates whether 
differences in “performance” among these non-profits or government institutions can even be 
found. However, both attempt to enhance the standard models used in most economic analyses 
by incorporating perspectives from other fields. If these integrated models shed greater light on 
issues that we have yet to fully understand, then perhaps future research should continue using 
this combination of multiple perspectives to enhance our knowledge of these somewhat 
complex but undoubtedly important issues.  
viii 
 
REFERENCES CITED: 
Akerlof, G. A., & Yellen, J. L. (1990). The fair wage-effort hypothesis and  unemployment. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(2), 255-283.  
Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2007). Measuring and Explaining Management Practices across 
Firms and Countries. The Quarterly Journal of Economics(4), 1351. doi: 
10.2307/25098879 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. 
Econometrica(2), 263. doi: 10.2307/1914185 
Rabin, M. (1998). Psychology and economics. Journal of economic literature, 36(1), 11-46.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
ESSAY #1: EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF LEADERSHIP HUMILITY AND EMPLOYEE 
VOICE ON CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 In highly competitive industries where firms aren’t protected by barriers to entry and 
consumers’ preferences are constantly changing, the willingness and ability to adapt and 
continually improve operations may be critical for continued success. However, the internal 
exchanges between employees and managers that may be an integral part of the development 
and implementation of new ideas are often not modeled or included in our standard economic 
theories.  
 In this research I investigate whether a higher level of employee voice (or employee 
input) predicts higher levels of continual improvement, and whether this continual improvement 
predicts higher levels of firm performance. Additionally, I will study whether humble managers 
keep this process going by fostering an environment where employees feel free to provide input. 
If this chain of events can help us better understand differences in firm performance then 
perhaps we can enhance our models by measuring and including these internal firm 
characteristics instead of simply leaving them inside the error term and calling them 
“unobservable.”  
 Results across three separate studies show that humble managers are more likely to be 
perceived as making continual improvements and higher levels of perceived continual 
improvement leads to both greater levels of employee voice and fewer perceived job obstacles. 
A pilot study involving two separate quick-food restaurant chains also lends support for the 
above ideas, but uses sales in dollars as the measure for performance. Additionally, holding the 
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employee constant in a fixed-effects analysis shows that the same employee is more likely to 
voice ideas to a manager he or she reports as continually improving the way things are done.  
2. MOTIVATION 
What makes a firm more profitable than its rivals, when they all exist within the same, 
highly competitive industry? Economists have often looked into explanations related to 
economies of scale or scope, patent protections, differentiated products, etc. but these are 
characteristics of industries that limit competition. What we need are explanations as to why 
firms within a highly competitive industry experience strikingly different levels of performance 
and profits, and most importantly, why above-average profits are not ultimately swept away as 
predicted by most standard economic models.  
 Fortunately, the work has already begun. Some leading economists are breaking the 
tradition and looking inside the firm for sources of performance heterogeneity. (See, for 
example, the many works of Bloom and Van Reenen.) Traditionally, economists treat all firms 
within an industry as exactly alike on the inside, assuming that they are all choosing the same 
approach to staying in business: maximizing profits. When all firms are solving the same 
equation, there’s no reason to look inside, because those who don’t optimize won’t survive.  
 However, what this assumption fails to appreciate are the many other potential 
approaches a firm can take to stay in business. For example, they could maximize employee 
productivity by focusing on employee-centered policies that make for a happy or more 
productive workforce, reducing turnover and therefore potentially reducing costs. They could 
also try to maximize the flow of new ideas, continually improving the way things are done, 
thereby continually increasing efficiency and lowering costs of doing business. Both of these 
strategies may lead to higher profits, yet the standard approach of assuming the firm simply 
chooses the optimal combination of labor and capital remains. Then, when the effect of these 
inputs on profits and performance leaves much to be explained inside the error term, we often 
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label the unobserved as “managerial quality” (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007) and ultimately leave 
it unmeasured and ignored. Although theoretically management could be handled just as any 
other input in a production function (such as capital or labor) (Nicholson & Snyder, 2008), most 
find it too cumbersome to measure and instead adopt an approach that “treats the firm as a 
single-decision making unit and sweeps away all the complicated behavioral issues” (pg. 359, 
Nicholson and Snyder (2008)). This view of the firm as a “black box” necessarily limits our 
understanding of important productivity and performance differences that are often observed 
across firms.  
 However, we can incorporate some of the measures of people and relationships from 
the fields of management and psychology into our theoretical models and see if we can further 
explain some of the variance in performance. Specifically, I propose to measure and test 
particular features of firms that I believe will add to our understanding of why some firms 
outperform and outlast their competition: the level of employee input that occurs and how 
responsive the management is to that employee input.   
 The goals of this research are to investigate whether these internal characteristics 
matter, and to what degree they are inter-related and connected. Specifically, do higher levels of 
employee voice (input) predict better performance? Are more humble managers more likely to 
be willing to use employee ideas, and does this impact the willingness of employees to voice 
their ideas? 
 These are the research questions I propose to test, combining what we know from 
economics, management and psychology to generate a model that incorporates the importance 
of internal characteristics in order to help explain firm performance heterogeneity that we often 
observe.  
 In the first study presented, survey data were collected from 251 employees working 
within various industries and firms and survey items were combined to create complex 
constructs. (Item analyses show reliability estimates that exceed 0.80). These constructs were 
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then analyzed using a recursive system of equations with three-stage least squares. Clearly this 
combines techniques and research methods from multiple fields, which can be a useful strategy 
when trying to analyze the impact of employees’ and managers’ behavioral characteristics on 
outcomes such as firm performance.  
 The second study uses a different sample of employees who each reported about two 
separate managers. This study uses fixed effects analysis to study whether it’s the 
characteristics of the employee that determine whether he or she voices ideas (meaning some 
people simply will or will not voice ideas across many situations) or if the how he or she 
perceives the manager who would hear the idea makes a difference in determining the 
employee’s willingness to provide helpful input. 
 The third study then uses observations from approximately 20 units across two separate 
quick-food restaurants to study whether the relationships found in Study #1 remain even while 
using actual sales in dollars as the performance measure.  
 Results across all three studies lend support to an alternatively specified model than the 
original. Specifically, humble leaders are more likely to be perceived as continually improving 
the way things are done and this continual improvement encourages even more ideas from the 
employees below. Additionally, it appears that this continual improvement is what leads to fewer 
job obstacles and higher sales, and that manager humility has no significant impact on 
performance once controlling for one consequence of manager humility: continual improvement. 
 The purpose of this research is to try to build a stronger understanding of which factors 
may be acting as some of the “unobservable” sources of differences in firm performance. 
Additionally, if this understanding allows us to pull these factors out of the error term and 
measure them and their effects directly, our models become slightly more enhanced and 
potentially better able to predict what causes the substantial and sustained firm heterogeneity 
that we often observe. 
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 The essay is structured as follows: section 3 outlines the relevant literature on which the 
ideas presented are based. Section 4 covers the methodology, the sample, and the data for the 
first study and Section 5 contains the results. Section 6 details the alternative specification 
found to more accurately capture what is found in the data. Section 7 describes the second 
study and Section 8 discusses the third study. The essay concludes with a discussion of the 
limitations of this research, followed by ideas that can correct these limitations in the future. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Dynamic Capabilities and Firm Performance  
This research problem focuses on a firm’s desire and capability to adapt, or more 
specifically stated, improve. A firm can, of course, improve processes to increase efficiency or 
improve products and services to increase customer satisfaction. Either way, the desire (and 
ability) to continually improve may also improve both the overall performance and the likelihood 
of surviving the turbulent dynamic markets within which so many firms operate. This idea runs 
parallel to the ‘dynamic capabilities’ perspective introduced over 15 years ago.  
The dynamic capabilities literature has been extensively developed in the strategic 
management field after first being introduced by Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997). They were 
extending the ideas of the ‘resource-based view (RBV) of the firm’ (introduced by Wernerfelt 
(1984) and later popularized by Barney (1991)) which held that firms need to own resources that 
are valuable, rare, inimitable and nonsubstitutable in order to achieve competitive advantage. 
Teece et al.  (1997) argued that owning these types of resources wasn’t enough; firms also 
needed the internal capabilities to deploy those resources (Wang & Ahmed, 2007). Specifically, 
since most markets are dynamic and constantly changing, in order to achieve a sustainable 
competitive advantage, firms must be able to “constantly… integrate, reconfigure, renew and 
recreate its resources and capabilities and, most importantly, upgrade and reconstruct its core 
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capabilities in response to the changing environment” (pg. 35). It is the emphasis on “upgrading” 
and “renewing” the resources that make this perspective especially relevant to this research.  
There are three factors that Wang and Ahmed (2007) put forth that “explain firms’ 
mechanisms of linking internal resource advantage to external marketplace-based competitive 
advantage” (emphasis added, pgs. 36-7): adaptive capabilities, absorptive capabilities and 
innovative capabilities. What will be argued here is that the internal resource advantage may 
come not only from patent protection or other barriers to entry, but also from having internal 
processes that cannot easily be imitated. Examples include specifically the constructs being 
studied here: namely, the amount of employee voice that occurs and the leadership style that 
encourages it. Managers who encourage ideas from all levels likely have the best possibility of 
developing these capabilities and additionally, will likely out-perform their counterparts whose 
adaptive or innovative capabilities are stifled by close-minded management.    
Because a distinction is often made in the literature between innovative and adaptive 
capabilities, I will employ a more general concept of “improvement capabilities.” This blends the 
two concepts and allows improvements to be caused by a need to adapt to changing market 
conditions (as in the adaptive capabilities literature), or simply by a desire to constantly improve 
(even when “unnecessary”). Additionally, the implemented idea may be completely new (or 
innovative) or it could be “borrowed” from competitors, the important thing only being that it 
improved productivity, efficiency or customer satisfaction for the firm that was not previously 
employing the idea. Using this term leaves sufficient room for various types of strategies and 
focuses on what I believe is the biggest determinant of remaining competitive: continual 
improvement.   
Indeed, links have been found between adaptive capabilities and firm evolution, survival 
and success (Wang and Ahmed (2007); see also Alvarez and Merino (2003), Camuffo and 
Volpato (1996), and Forrant and Flynn (1999). Other studies have found these outcomes linked 
specifically to innovative capabilities (see, for example, Deeds, Decarolis, and Coombs (1999); 
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Delmas (1999); Lazonick and Prencipe (2005); Petroni (1998); Tripsas (1997)). I propose not 
only to combine these capabilities into one construct, but also hope to provide employee voice 
(and management styles that encourage it) as specific and clear antecedents that help build and 
sustain these capabilities. 
3.2 Employee Voice 
There has been a great deal of research done in organizational behavior which focuses 
on employees taking part in building a firm’s competitive advantage. “Employee voice” in 
particular is one avenue through which employees can contribute to the success of the firm. 
This construct has been defined in various ways, but most researchers follow the definition put 
forth by Van Dyne (see, for example, Van Dyne and LePine (1998); Botero and Van Dyne 
(2009); Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero (2003), which specifies that employee voice occurs when an 
employee “makes innovative suggestions for change and recommends modifications to 
standard procedures,” utilized not to criticize, but instead to “proactively express constructive 
suggestions” (Botero and Van Dyne (2009), pg 87). Employee voice, then, relates specifically to 
improvement ideas suggested by employees that may lead to a greater level of success for the 
organization. (To be clear, this means it does not include employee complaints or 
dissatisfactions that don’t bring with them potential improvement solutions.)  
Many researchers have attempted to discover what influences employee voice, what 
types of people are most likely to engage in it, and under what conditions it is most likely to 
occur. For example, studies have found that certain managerial characteristics such as 
openness and responsiveness (Saunders, 1992) or transformational leadership (Detert & Burris, 
2007) encourage employees to express their ideas. In addition, employees are more likely to 
speak up if they perceive that speaking up is safe and/or will be effective and make a difference 
(Morrison, 2011), and if personal beliefs such as power distance orientation leads one to believe 
that authority in power should or can be challenged (Botero & Van Dyne, 2009). Additionally, 
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gender, experience in the field and tenure with the organization have been found to be 
individual-level characteristics that help predict employee voice (Morrison, 2011). Organizational 
characteristics such as the structure and bureaucracy can also either provide or withhold 
opportunities for ideas to be communicated and create an environment that either makes the 
ideas more likely to be implemented or more likely to be ignored. These factors can therefore 
impact how willing the employees will be to generate and communicate new ideas that may truly 
improve the organization and help it build a sustainable competitive advantage.   
However, despite the growing focus on employee voice in the literature, most studies 
test only potential antecedents or causes of employee voice and only imply (usually somewhere 
in the introduction) that employee voice is likely good for the organization. Therefore, one 
contribution of this research is testing whether employee voice does, in fact, affect performance. 
Additionally, I show that when employees perceive their managers to be willing to continually 
improve the way things are done, they are more likely to report voicing ideas to them.  
3.3 The Role of Management 
 The attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of managers can play a major role in whether 
employees first even make the effort to generate ideas that may benefit the organization, but 
then can also impact whether they take the time and potential risks associated with voicing 
those ideas upward. More specifically, managers may either openly encourage input from all 
levels or they may instead make most decisions on their own and prefer employees to listen and 
simply follow directions without offering their own ideas on how things should be done. Indeed, 
many managers believe subordinates are subordinates for a reason, and that they have nothing 
beneficial to add besides the completion of the tasks assigned to them. However, other 
managers think that good ideas can come from any level, and therefore their behaviors reflect 
an open and responsive environment where ideas flow freely from all directions. I propose that 
this latter type of leader will be found at those organizations experiencing the highest levels of 
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employee voice. This type of leader has been referred to by many names, but most of all, this 
leader can certainly be referred to as humble.  
3.4 Humility 
 “Leader humility is still viewed as a rare personality trait that somewhat mysteriously 
produces favorable organizational outcomes” (Owens & Hekman, 2012). In contrast with the 
more conventional idea that leaders should portray themselves as superstars, there have been 
calls for leaders to “show their humanness by being open about their limitations in knowledge 
and experience” (Weick (2001), as quoted by Owens and Hekman (2012)), especially since the 
workplace is becoming increasingly more complex and adaptability is now essentially required 
for survival (Weick (2001), referenced by Owens and Hekman (2012)). 
However, exactly what humility is or what humble leader behaviors look like is still 
unclear (Owens & Hekman, 2012). In a great summary of the previous literature, Owens and 
Hekman (2012) synthesize the various ways scholars and others have defined humility as 
involving “how leaders tend to view themselves more objectively, others more appreciatively 
and new information or ideas more openly” (pg 789). Put another way, those who are humble 1) 
acknowledge their limitations, 2) are open to others’ ideas and 3) view others appreciatively 
without feeling threatened by their potential contributions (B. P. Owens, Rowatt, & Wilkins, 
2011). These characteristics are likely to be some of the underlying attitudes and beliefs of 
managers that foster the kind of environment where employees feel comfortable and safe 
expressing ideas, as well as encouraged or appreciated for doing so. When a leader is able to 
acknowledge his or her limitations they are likely more willing to seek the ideas and opinions of 
others, including their subordinates. When they can “spotlight followers’ strengths and 
contributions” (pg. 794) then these followers are likely more willing to spend the time and energy 
generating and communicating their ideas for improving company performance. If employee 
input is, in fact, found to affect the ultimate success of the firm through enriching ideas to 
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improve processes, products or services, and a manager’s perceived level of humility positively 
impacts employee voice, then we can add these management and employee behaviors to our 
models to better explain how some companies so successfully out-perform their competition 
inside ever-evolving, dynamic markets. 
3.5 Contributions to Existing Literature 
 Existing economic models focus mainly on inputs and outputs to describe a firm’s profit-
maximization problem, and describe differences in performance that we observe in data as 
unobservable differences in efficiencies among firms. I will argue that these “unobservable” 
characteristics occurring inside the firm can (and should) be modeled using techniques that 
have been employed by other fields for many years. An integrated model incorporating theories 
of management and psychology, for example, may shed better light on what determines 
performance heterogeneity across firms over a model using isolated theories from economics. 
Perhaps management and employees affect profits not only through productivity, but also 
through influencing the flow of ideas and continual improvement. If these things can be 
measured, I offer them as potential reasons some firms continually outlast and out-perform their 
rivals while others fail when market conditions change.  
 Contributions to the existing literature on employee voice come from showing that 
employees do perhaps need to feel that their ideas may be implemented, not just heard. 
(Perceived efficacy of voice may be important.) Additionally, the consequences of voice may not 
simply be assumed to be positive, as is usually done in introductions to voice research  
(Morrison, 2011). Instead, a moderating relationship may be more appropriate, where the 
outcomes of employee voice depend heavily on whether the manager is willing to implement 
ideas and try new things when suggested by the employees. Additionally, researchers studying 
humility are still trying to determine potential consequences of humility in management. I hope 
to add support to the idea that humble managers not only encourage employee ideas, but also 
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may be more likely to continually improve processes, products and services, thereby further 
impacting performance.  
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS- STUDY #1 
4.1 Conceptual Framework 
A visual representation of the full model based on the ideas presented above is provided 
below: 
 
First, do humble managers inspire or encourage greater levels of employee voice? 
Second, when more ideas related to fixing inefficiencies are flowing around (greater levels of 
employee voice), do employees also perceive greater levels of continual improvement (i.e., 
more ideas actually being implemented)? Finally, are greater levels of continual improvement 
also associated with fewer perceived job obstacles within the firm?   
 Support for this model would show that these factors could be some of the missing 
pieces in our profit maximization equations, especially helping to predict which firms may be 
Humility 
Employee 
Voice 
Continual 
Improvement 
Perceived 
Efficiency 
Figure 1:  
Conceptual Model 
Figure 1: Visual Representation of Model 
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more able and likely to adapt and survive constantly changing market conditions. If so, 
incorporating them into our standard economic models may help us better explain the firm 
heterogeneity that we often observe but cannot (or do not) measure.  
4.2 Data 
4.2.1 Data collection method 
Survey data were collected from a convenience sample of employed university students, 
online from reddit.com internet users and from personal contacts. All were asked to respond 
electronically to the survey questions, and data were collected over a 12 month period. The final 
sample consists of 251 working adults from a wide range of industries. Unfortunately, data on 
participants’ gender and ages are not available for this sample.  
4.2.2 Survey instrument 
The employees each responded to a survey that included questions related to their 
perceptions of their manager’s humility, their own voice behaviors, and other measures related 
to their workplace and supervisor1. (A full discussion of items follows in the next section). Since 
respondents were from a variety of industries and firms, a subjective measure of efficiency in 
the workplace works well to create a somewhat universal measure (as opposed to performance 
being measured by number of goals hit, number of clients, etc.). This subjective performance 
measure relates to perceived job obstacles by the employees; specifically, if they feel as though 
things get in the way of them doing their job well. This can be measured across various work 
environments but maintain its meaning related to inefficiencies in the workplace. 
A blending of data collection methods is helpful since this research involves complex 
constructs that aren’t easily measured by one clear, objective variable. With complex constructs, 
it’s best to collect data on several different aspects of the construct and blend them to create 
                                               
1
 Respondents chose the manager about which to respond after being prompted in the following way: 
“Please answer the following questions about one of your supervisors/managers that you work with at 
your current location. Keep this manager in mind for the remainder of the survey.” 
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one measure of the variable, similar to what economists do for “socio-economic status” or even 
the consumer price index. The combined items produce a measure of reliability (see α below 
next to each construct) that represents the individual items’ inter-relatedness. All of the survey 
items and constructs are detailed in the sections that follow and Table 1A displays the entire 
survey instrument used in this research. The responses range from one to five for every item, 
from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” or from “Never” to “Always”, whichever is more 
appropriate for the particular question. Table 2A shows the summary statistics for each variable 
obtained from the sample in Study #1. 
4.2.3 Measures 
Job obstacles (α=0.89): Perceived levels of efficiency are being used as a proxy for 
performance. Perceived levels of efficiency will be measured by the report of “organizational 
obstacles” that get in the way of the employee doing his or her job. In any industry, at any 
company, when things prohibit employees from doing their job well, performance is likely to 
suffer. As this measure is a general one of perceived obstacles inhibiting performance, it can be 
collected from employees working under different conditions within different organizations and 
still be used for comparisons and analyses. Specifically, the measures include “Things get in the 
way of me doing my job well”; “Things get in the way of me offering good service to my 
customers”; and “Things get in the way of our customers being easily satisfied.” It can then be 
tested whether higher levels of employee voice lead to fewer perceived job obstacles within the 
workplace. Additionally, the model will test whether more job obstacles are associated with 
lower job satisfaction, which can further impact performance through reduced turnover costs 
related to training, recruiting and learning-curve inefficiencies (Brown & Mitchell, 1993).  
Employee voice (α=0.96): Several different instruments exist that measure employee 
voice behavior within an organization. The most widely used self-report instruments include 
those from Van Dyne and LePine (1998), and these will be modified slightly in order to address 
the specific issues of this research. For instance, “I develop and make recommendations to this 
14 
 
supervisor [that could improve work processes]” and “I develop and make recommendations to 
this supervisor [that could improve customer satisfaction]” should help capture whether 
employees are engaged in generating and communicating ideas for continual improvement that 
may affect the overall performance of their organization or workplace. Additionally, Detert and 
Burris (2007) employed the question “I give suggestions about how to make [our department 
and/or company] better”, and this, too, will be included. These three items are combined to 
generate a score for each employee related to their self-reported “voice behaviors.”  
Humility (α=0.94):  Humility or humble leader behaviors are measured using items from 
a scale developed by B. P. Owens, Johnson, and Mitchell (2013). Example items include “This 
supervisor admits it when they don’t know how to do something”, “This supervisor is willing to 
learn from others” and “This supervisor is open to the ideas of others.” It may seem obvious how 
humility in leadership would likely lead to an increased willingness to hear and use employee 
ideas, but these links have yet to be empirically tested. The full list of items making up this 
construct (along with the full survey instrument) is provided in Table 1A.  
Continual improvement (α=0.90):  Continual improvement is a construct created 
specifically for this study. It attempts to measure whether the manager makes changes to 
improve customer satisfaction, makes changes to improve efficiency, and “continually improves 
the way things are done.” From the definition of management humility, it would make sense that 
humble managers are not only willing to listen to the ideas of others, but may also be more 
willing to implement new ideas (of their own and those of others). Factor analysis confirms that 
although the two measures’ descriptions may sound as though they are both capturing the 
same thing, they are, in fact, different constructs. (Two Eigen values over one; discriminatory 
factors confirmed by an oblique oblimin rotation with no cross-loadings over 0.08.) Additionally, 
because this construct is measured as whether the manager is perceived to implement new 
improvement ideas in general (not specifically employee ideas), it also has discriminant validity 
with the employee voice construct. Put another way, employees were asked if they voice 
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improvement ideas to their managers and whether their managers implement improvement 
ideas, not whether their managers implement their (the employee’s) improvement ideas. This 
separation allows testing of whether managers who are perceived to continually try to improve 
the way things are done are more likely to experience employees trying to be a part of the 
process.  
Supervisor is able to make changes (α=0.93): If constraints exist to making changes in 
the workplace, then even the most humble leader and the highest levels of employee voice 
likely won’t have much of an impact. Therefore, a control variable for a manager’s ability to 
make changes is included in the analysis. There are two items: “This supervisor is able to make 
changes to improve our customer satisfaction” and “This supervisor is able to make changes to 
improve the way we do things.”  
Job satisfaction:  As noted briefly above, since job satisfaction can impact firm 
performance through turnover costs and employee productivity, it will be tested whether the 
constructs above also impact job satisfaction. If they do, then humble leadership, employee 
voice and continual improvement can have indirect influences on performance through these 
channels in addition to the direct influences being tested with the model outlined above. Job 
satisfaction is measured with a simple job satisfaction question: “All in all, I am satisfied with my 
job.” 
Power distance (α=0.79):  As mentioned previously in the section detailing the literature 
on employee voice, power distance has been found to be negatively correlated with employee 
voice. Power distance captures whether the employee believes that authority should not be 
challenged, and is measured with the following three items taken from Botero and Van Dyne 
(2009): “It is better to not disagree with this supervisor's decisions”, “When this supervisor 
makes a decision with which I disagree I prefer to accept the decision rather than question it” 
and “I believe that it is not right to disagree with this supervisor.” 
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 4.3 Econometric Strategy 
 The above model implies a particular order of the variables, which can be tested using 
simultaneous equation modeling (SEM) and three-stage-least-squares (3SLS). This method 
treats the equations as part of one system, and as such, allows the errors of the equations to be 
correlated. Essentially, this method is similar to 2-stage least squares (2SLS), except in a third 
stage the variance/covariance matrix is re-estimated from the presence of the system of 
equations and their errors. (A system of equations is likely to have errors that are correlated 
across the different equations and 3SLS accounts for this.) As long as the equations are 
correctly specified, then estimation using a system approach will give more efficient estimates 
then the alternative 2SLS estimation equation-by-equation, since allowing them to be 
simultaneously estimated means more information available for each estimate. Of course, when 
using a systems approach, consistent estimates are only recovered if the entire system is 
correctly specified (Wooldridge, 2002). For this reason, 2SLS can be employed as a robustness 
check since correct specification of all equations within the model is not required to obtain 
consistent estimation of any one given equation. Both methods will therefore be examined and 
compared since both produce consistent estimates (as long as identification is achieved through 
sufficient exclusions restrictions) and because one is more efficient and the other is more robust 
to misspecification.  
Humility is the foundation and starting point of the ideas set forth in this research. The 
leadership’s level of humility will likely impact whether an employee feels that ideas voiced for 
improvement will be welcomed and/or given serious thought. Therefore, the first equation in the 
system is: 
 
   𝑉𝑖 = 𝛽10 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑔𝑟_𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑃𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽13𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑢1                (1) 
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where 𝑉𝑖 is the measure of self-reported employee voice behavior by individual 𝑖. 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑖 is the 
measure of the perceived humility of the employee’s manager as reported by the same 
employee 𝑖. It is, of course, the perceived level of management humility that should impact the 
employee’s voice behavior, not the actual level (or self-report of the manager). For this reason, 
the single-source method is both appropriate and beneficial.  𝑃𝐷𝑖  is the power distance 
orientation of the employee. The first subscript on each of the parameters indicates that this is 
the first equation in the system. Here, the parameter of interest will be 𝛽11, which estimates the 
relationship between perceptions of the manager’s humility and the self-reported employee 
voice behavior related to ideas for improvement. If the conceptual model is supported, this 
parameter will be both positive and significant. 𝛽12 is expected to be negative since a higher 
level of power distance orientation should be negatively related to voice behaviors of 
subordinates. It is also thought that the manager’s ability to make changes to the workplace will 
impact whether an employee feels it is worthwhile to communicate ideas for improvement, so 
this variable is included as well and its coefficient (𝛽13)is expected to be positive. 
 The second equation in the system implies that employee voice affects the continual 
improvement of the firm:  
 
   𝐶𝐼𝑖 = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽22𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑢2               (2) 
 
Here, 𝐶𝐼𝑖 measures whether employee 𝑖 feels as though the supervisor continually improves the 
way things are done.  Again, it’s probably more important to find out if the employee feels that 
the work processes are continually being improved. Asking the manager if he or she 
continuously makes improvements can lead to bias in measurement for two reasons: 1) 
because it may be “socially desirable” for managers to continuously make improvements, and 2) 
because the manager may truly believe improvements are being made while the staff on the 
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ground (the ones dealing with the new “improvements” directly) may disagree. Additionally, 
since the questions are posed using language such as “continually improves” and “makes 
changes to improve…” it is hoped that what is captured is whether this occurs frequently and in 
general, not whether a recent change was made which may excite varied levels of support and 
acceptance.  
The parameter of interest is of 𝛽21 , which is the effect of an individual’s report of 
employee voice behavior on the perception of the level of continual improvement implemented 
by the manager. If the model is supported, greater levels of employee ideas would be 
associated with higher levels of continual improvement by the managers. Additionally, the level 
of continual improvement reported depends on whether the manager has the ability to make 
changes. If so, 𝛽22 will be both positive and significant.  
The third equation then relates continual improvement to the firm’s performance, 
measured by the level of perceived job obstacles within the firm: 
 
   𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽30 + 𝛽31𝐶𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽32𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑢3         (3) 
 
where 𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 are the perceived job obstacles at the firm reported by employee 𝑖 and 𝐶𝐼𝑖 
comes from the equation above. Here, perceived job obstacles are acting as a proxy for 
performance.  
 The final equation tests whether the preceding equation predicts job satisfaction, which, 
in addition to efficiency in work processes, may help keep costs down and performance up. The 
equation is as follows: 
 
   𝐽𝑜𝑏_𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖 = 𝛽40 + 𝛽41𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽42𝑀𝑔𝑟_𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝑢4                    (4) 
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where 𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 is from equation (3) and perception of the manager’s humility is thought to 
perhaps also influence job satisfaction beyond the effect of his or her humility on job obstacles.  
5. RESULTS 
 The model's estimated standardized parameters are shown in Table 4A in the Appendix. 
In the first equation, perceived management humility is positively related to reported levels of 
employee voice. A one standard deviation increase in perceived humility is associated with an 
approximately 0.4 standard deviation increase in reported voice behaviors. Change ability also 
has a positive effect, and as predicted, power distance orientation has a negative effect. 
Equation (2) shows that the level of employee voice reported (instrumented by the exogenous 
variation in voice) is significantly related to continual improvement, even after controlling for 
change ability. Continual improvement is then negatively and significantly related to reported job 
obstacles, and job obstacles are negatively and significantly related to reported job satisfaction. 
Therefore, this estimation shows that the hypothesized model is supported: manager humility is 
associated with greater levels of employee voice, which are positively associated with continual 
improvement in the firm. Greater perceived levels of continual improvement are associated with 
fewer perceived job obstacles. Finally, more job obstacles are associated with less job 
satisfaction. (Perceived manager humility is also found to be positively associated with reported 
job satisfaction.)  
 However, in the above model, management humility is excluded from the continual 
improvement equation. Upon testing this exclusion, something very interesting occurs: 
employee voice goes insignificant. Table 5A shows what happens when management humility is 
included in equation (2). With employee voice no longer having its own effect on continual 
improvement additional to the perceived level of humility, it appears that the original model 
needs improvement. Perhaps management humility (being open to advice and ideas, modeling 
teachability, and giving credit where it’s due) is the main reason employee voice was found to 
20 
 
affect continual improvement. In other words, the manager’s humility leads to both being open 
to listening to ideas and to implementing them. If this is the case, employee voice (when 
instrumented with manager humility (among the other exogenous regressors)) would show up 
as significantly related to continual improvement. However, once manager humility is itself 
included, employee voice no longer has a significant impact. This makes sense: employee voice 
is only helpful when the management is open to trying new ideas (such as when the manager is 
humble). If the ideas always fall on deaf ears or the manager is not open to giving the 
improvement ideas a chance, then they likely won’t positively impact continual improvement or 
reduce job obstacles within the firm. A discussion and re-specification of the model follows 
below. 
6. DISCUSSION AND ALTERNATIVE MODELSPECIFICATIONS 
 One surprising result was the impact of management humility on many of these 
constructs. It appears that this trait may lead to great results for an organization in a variety of 
ways: influencing the number of improvement ideas that employees communicate upwards, 
directly impacting reported job satisfaction of the employees, and also impacting the level of 
continual improvement, potentially through these types of managers simply being willing to try 
new things. Therefore, the question may need to become: Are humble managers also more 
willing to try new things, in addition to being open to others ideas? Since a humble leader is one 
who understands the value in others’ ideas and contributions, it makes sense that he or she 
may understand that every decision they make or process they implement isn’t necessarily the 
“right” one and therefore may change it if necessary by trying something new. A leader who 
doesn’t continually question the processes that he or she implements may be blind to any 
inefficiencies that remain in place, or even to those that are unintentionally created.   
 The link between continual improvement and perceived efficiency isn’t as surprising of 
course, but signals an important phenomenon: in order to achieve greater levels of efficiency (at 
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least as they are perceived by the employees), managers can strive to continually improve the 
work processes and customer service standards in place. This seems obvious, but in reality 
there appear to be many managers that don’t seem to get it. In fact, 50% of this sample gave 
their manager a score at or below a 3. In competitive markets, that score may not be enough to 
ensure survival of constantly changing consumer preferences and unpredictable market 
conditions. 
 Perhaps the most interesting finding was the fact that the effects of employee voice on 
continual improvement disappear when humble leadership is accounted for. Not only does 
leadership humility appear to greatly impact employee voice, but that same humility impacts 
continual improvement and makes employee voice by itself appear to have no additional impact. 
This could be very important to explore further and better understand, as it gives us added 
insight into the effects of employee voice. Essentially, it could be the case that it’s not that 
employee ideas by themselves are helpful for an organization. Rather, it may be the 
environment created by humble management (which of course impacts the level of employee 
voice in the firm) that is truly impacting the level of continual improvement and perceived levels 
of efficiency within the company. If this is the case, then employee voice needs to be further 
investigated as simply one consequence of leadership humility, and this leadership humility 
ultimately deserves the brunt of the credit for impacting continual improvement.    
 Based on these revelations and findings, an alternative specification was explored: since 
we now know that humility may be directly connected to continual improvement, perhaps it’s the 
observed continual improvement that the manager carries out that further leads to voice. 
Essentially, employees observe that their manager is able and willing to make changes to 
continually improve the way things are done, and that leads them to be more willing to 
communicate ideas upward to their manager. Therefore perhaps manager humility impacts 
voice only indirectly through its effect on increasing continual improvement (rather than the 
manager’s humility directly impacting voice). This model was tested and the results are shown 
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in Table 6A, where equation 1 is now that which has continual improvement as the dependent 
variable.  
 We see that a manager’s humility and his or her ability to make changes are both 
positively associated with continual improvement taking place within the firm. Additionally, 
manager humility is positively associated with voice. That is, until you include continual 
improvement. These results show that once continual improvement is controlled for, manager 
humility no longer significantly impacts an employee’s willingness to voice ideas upward. This 
implies that it isn’t simply a manager being willing to listen to ideas from employees that 
encourage greater levels of employee voice. Instead, it’s whether the manager is perceived to 
implement ideas that improve the way things are done. The manager’s humility and his or her 
ability to make changes both impact whether he or she is perceived to make changes, and 
when he or she does on a continual basis, it appears to encourage even more ideas from 
employees.  
 Looking at the results from equation (3), employee voice appears to be associated with 
fewer reported job obstacles. However, upon further examination and tests of exclusion 
restrictions, we see in the second model of Table 6A that employee voice is no longer directly 
related to job obstacles once continual improvement is included. Again, this makes perfect 
sense: the amount of employee voice has no bearing on performance if the ideas are not 
appreciated and/or explored by the decision-makers in power. Instead, it’s the amount of 
continual improvement that occurs that reduces job obstacles. We also see the manager’s 
humility rating has no effect on reported job obstacles once we include and control for the 
amount of continual improvement taking place within the firm. Both tables show that job 
obstacles continue to negatively affect job satisfaction. This final proposed model is represented 
below.  
 The importance of being perceived as being willing and able to make changes to 
improve the way things are done or improve customer satisfaction appears to be crucial. 
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However, it also appears that managers who display humility are more likely to be perceived in 
this way. In an environment with constantly changing market conditions and constantly 
emerging new competition, this leadership style could therefore become extremely important. 
Additionally, allowing managers to make changes as necessary (or even before they’re 
necessary) may also be an essential piece of the profit-maximizing puzzle.  
 
Figure 2: Revised conceptual model 
7. STUDY #2- FIXED EFFECTS ANALYSES 
 The first study supported the idea that humble leadership is associated with greater 
levels of continual improvement, and that greater continual improvement was associated with 
both greater levels of employee voice and fewer job obstacles. The second study uses the 
same constructs, but a different estimation strategy to try to get toward more of a causal 
interpretation of the effect of a manager’s style or behavior on employee voice. This study uses 
a different data set than that used in the first study, although obtained similarly from different 
students, reddit.com internet users and employees of two quick-service food restaurants.  
Humility 
Employee 
Voice 
Continual 
Improvement 
Fewer 
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Figure 2:  
Revised Conceptual Model 
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 In this study, employees were asked to respond about two different managers with 
whom they work directly, the highest level manager (here, called “top manager”) and any other 
manager they choose (here, called “other manager”). Using a fixed effects strategy, we can hold 
the employee constant to measure whether this same employee is more or less likely to voice 
ideas to their two different managers based on his or her ratings of the two different managers’ 
level of humility. The results are shown in Table 8A.  
 This fixed effects estimation strategy shows us that differences in the employee’s 
perceptions of their two different managers’ humility are associated with differences in that 
employee’s reported voice behaviors toward those managers, implying more of a causal link 
than was testable with the data used in Study #1. The rating of the manager’s humility 
influences the level of voice toward that manager- the higher the humility rating, the more likely 
the employee is to voice improvement ideas to that manager. This could lead to more ideas 
from all levels, which, if then implemented, could improve both efficiency within the workplace 
and customer satisfaction (since these are the types of ideas being voiced that “employee 
voice” is measuring). In this study, it is the manager’s humility associated with the level of 
employee voice and not the perceived level of continual improvement across the two managers. 
There are several explanations for this contradictory result. 1) In the first study with 3SLS, 
continual improvement was being instrumented by humility, meaning it could be that I was 
actually finding the effects of humility in managers working through continual improvement. It 
was the exogenous part of continual improvement (as predicted by the manager’s humility, 
ability to make changes and the employee’s power distance orientation) that was found to be 
associated with employee voice and a similar specification is difficult with fixed effects. 2) 
Additionally with fixed effects, the coefficient will be significant if differences in the two 
managers’ continual improvement are associated with differences in voice behaviors. Perhaps 
in this sample, the two managers chosen don’t vary enough on this dimension.  
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 As was also done in Study #1, we can test whether differences in humility ratings are 
associated with differences in continual improvement ratings (using the same fixed effects 
strategy used above). The results are shown in Table 9A. We see similar results to the first 
study: it appears that voice is positively associated with continual improvement, but only until 
humility ratings are included. We see that humility ratings are positively associated with 
continual improvement ratings and that a one standard deviation in humility is associated with 
more than a half standard deviation increase in perceived continual improvement. 
 It’s important to note that we cannot necessarily infer a causal link between humility and 
continual improvement using this data. The reason for this is that here we are still holding the 
employee constant, meaning the results can only be interpreted as whether differences in the 
employee’s ratings of his or her two managers’ humility are associated with differences in the 
same employee’s ratings of those two managers’ levels of continual improvement. Put another 
way, both ratings are about two different managers from the same employee, so what we see is 
that employees who perceive their manager as more humble also rate those managers higher 
on the continual improvement scale (similar to what we saw and estimated in Study #1). For the 
humility-voice relationship, the results can instead be interpreted as differences in the 
employee’s ratings of his or her two managers’ humility leading to differences in the same 
employee’s willingness to voice ideas. Since we hold the person whose behavior we are 
measuring constant, it means that an employee isn’t equally likely to voice ideas to their 
managers no matter how they perceive the managers. Instead, the perception of the manager’s 
humility has an influence on the employee’s voice behaviors.   
 Unfortunately the fixed effects approach doesn’t allow us to test any of the relationships 
from the first study that used variables that don’t vary across the managers (for instance job 
satisfaction) since these variables take the same value within each person. I am also unable to 
use fixed effects to test the impacts of humble leadership or continual improvement on job 
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obstacles, as job obstacles relate to the job (not the manager) so the value doesn’t vary across 
the employee observation.  
 Nonetheless, this data set can help provide further support for the relationships found in 
the first study if we go back to using simple linear regressions. Each employee responded about 
his or her highest-level manager under which they work, as well as another, lower-level 
manager. We can therefore again test the relationship between manager humility ratings and 
employee voice (for each of the two managers) by running separate regressions for each of the 
manager types. The results for the two simple linear regressions are provided in Table 10A. We 
see that perceived humility still has the same positive effect on employee voice that was found 
in the first study, although again, the effect becomes insignificant once continual improvement is 
included (columns (2) and (4)). Continual improvement of the lower manager is significantly 
related to voice to that same manager at the 10% level and continual improvement of the top 
manager is also positively and significantly related to voice toward that same manager (at the 
5% level). 
 An additional use of these data allows for a robustness check to further test the humility-
voice link and continual improvement-voice link by testing whether the perceived humility (or 
continual improvement) of Manager B affects an employee’s reported voice toward Manager A. 
(We shouldn’t expect the humility rating of Manager A to influence my willingness to voice ideas 
to Manager B.) The results are shown in Table 11A. We see that voice toward the top manager 
is unaffected by the perceived humility of another (lower level) manager (which is what we 
would expect). The same is true about continual improvement. However, we also see an 
interesting result coming out of regressing voice toward a lower manager on the perceived 
humility and continual improvement of the top manager (column 2). It seems as though voice 
toward a lower manager may be affected by both the humility and the continual improvement of 
the top manager! However, it appears as though the more humble to top manager, the less 
likely an employee is to voice ideas to the manager at the lower level. This seems to describe a 
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situation in which employees will go to the top (and skip lower level) of management when those 
at the top are themselves willing to listen to ideas. However, we see a positive and significant 
effect of the top manager’s continual improvement on voice toward the lower manager, 
suggesting that perhaps a top manager can create an environment or culture where 
improvement ideas tried and implemented, and this type of culture may lead to greater levels of 
employee voice toward any manager. Indeed, the effect of the top manager’s continual 
improvement on voice toward the lower manager remains significant at below the 1% level even 
after including perceptions of the lower manager’s willingness to continually improve. (And in 
fact, the top manager’s continual improvement has almost double the impact of the lower 
manager’s continual improvement on voice toward the lower manager. See the results in the 
final column of Table 11A.)  This provides further support for the argument that the manager at 
the top can have effects on employee voice that permeate throughout the firm.  
 We can now also test the effects of continual improvement (from both managers) on the 
perceived level of job obstacles present in the workplace. (The results are provided in Table 
12A.) Here we see results similar to those found in Study #1. Greater levels of employee voice 
are negatively related to reported job obstacles (although only at the 10% level and only for 
voice toward the lower manager), but not once continual improvement is included. Interestingly, 
it appears that it’s actually the perceived continual improvement of the lower manager that has 
the impact on perceived job obstacles. This has a few implications- although the continual 
improvement of the top manager may lead to greater levels of voice to even lower managers, 
it’s actually when the lower level manager is perceived to continually improve things that 
employees perceive few job obstacles. This may mean that top managers may benefit 
additionally from allowing the lower level managers to make changes when necessary (or even 
prior to being “necessary”) to resolve inefficiencies or to adapt to changing conditions. If they do, 
employees may at the very least perceive a more efficiently running workplace.  
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 Of course, job obstacles are still being reported by the same source that is rating 
manager humility and continual improvement, potentially leading to a single-source bias. (This is 
because it’s possible that when the employee perceives the manager continually improving 
things he or she also perceives fewer obstacles in the workplace.) The only way to get around 
this problem is to use a more objective measure of performance from a separate source. This is 
the purpose of the third and final study.  
8. STUDY #3- THE CASE OF TWO QUICK-FOOD RESTAURANTS 
 Data were collected from employees and managers of 2 quick-service restaurant chains 
in the South-eastern region of the United States. The humility and voice ratings were averaged 
across the employees within each unit to create a unit-level measure, since performance is 
measured using monthly sales in dollars at the unit level. “Brand 1” has 8 different units and 
“Brand 2” has 11. Using these data, we can test whether humble leadership and continual 
improvement impact a firm’s sales performance. The same 3SLS model was estimated using 
this data and the results are shown in Table 15A. 
 Although the sample size is extremely small, it is worth noting that the results found in 
Study #1 (which captured responses from only one source) are replicated and we now see that 
continual improvement doesn’t just affect perceived job obstacles but also actual sales in 
dollars! All the variables have been standardized so that the coefficients are interpreted as how 
many standard deviations the dependent variable changes when the independent variable 
changes by one standard deviation (holding all others in the equation constant). 
 The results show that manager humility is positively and significantly related to perceived 
continual improvement, and that this continual improvement is positively related to employee 
voice (although only at the 10% level) and to sales in dollars. A one standard deviation increase 
in continual improvement is associated with almost a ¾ standard deviation in sales. (This 
translates into approximately an extra $10,000 in monthly sales. Of course without panel data 
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it’s unclear whether the effect of continual improvement would increase sales each month by 
$10,000 but we do see that stores with a one standard deviation higher rating of continual 
improvement are associated with approximately $10,000 in higher sales2.)  
 Additionally, we still see that a one standard deviation increase in the average humility 
rating increases the average level of perceived continual improvement by 0.9 standard 
deviations. Also, as found in Study #1, better performance is associated with higher levels of job 
satisfaction. (Of course, in Study #1 performance was measured by perceived job obstacles 
where here it is measured by sales in dollars.) 
 Since the manager’s average humility ratings by the employees may have embedded 
within them other factors that could potentially impact performance, another test using the 
manager’s self-rating can be used to provide further (and possibly more robust) support for the 
idea that a willingness to take actions on ideas to improve the workplace actually has an impact 
on performance. Specifically, the managers were asked whether they use employee ideas to 
make changes and improve the way things are done. Using the manager’s self-rating of using 
and implementing employee ideas gets away from the potential issues of using employee 
ratings of manager humility and continual improvement since the employee’s ratings may also 
include other factors that could impact sales. The results from this regression are shown in 
Table 16A.  
 The results show that a manager’s own rating is also positively associated with sales; a 
one standard deviation increase in the manager’s own report of using employee ideas is 
associated with a 0.8 standard deviation increase in higher sales, even after controlling the 
employees’ perceptions of continual improvement. This is also interesting because it shows that 
                                               
2
 Note that brand is included as a control due the differences in the levels of sales for each brand. The 
coefficient on continual improvement can then be thought of as measuring the effect of continual 
improvement on changes in sales within each brand. 
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managers with higher sales are more likely to report that they use employee ideas to improve 
the way things are done, crediting the employees with part of the success. 
 Although this third study is only exploratory due to the current small sample size, all 
three studies lend support to the idea that humble managers are more likely to be perceived as 
implementing more improvement ideas. Additionally, those managers who are perceived to 
make these improvements seem to encourage greater levels of employee voice, and greater 
continual improvement seems to be positively associated with both fewer perceived job 
obstacles and higher sales in dollars. The triangulation of the three different studies allows for a 
more conclusive and robust argument for all of the relationships tested here, but more research 
needs to be done. The limitations and possible future work are outlined in the subsequent 
section. 
9. DISCUSSION  
 First, I tried to establish that a relationship exists between employee voice and manager 
humility. I then tested it against holding constant all time-invariant (or personal trait) 
characteristics to show that it is in fact the perception of the manager’s humility that affects a 
person’s decision to voice ideas upward. I also showed that average voice ratings within a store 
are associated with average ratings of that store manager’s humility.  
 However, upon further investigation, it appears that it’s more important that employees 
perceive their managers as implementing ideas, not just listening to them. All three studies 
supported this new alternative specification. In Study #2, we also saw that continual 
improvement of the top manager is even associated with greater employee voice toward lower 
managers. Additionally, across all three studies we see that continual improvement is 
associated with fewer perceived job obstacles and higher sales.   
 In the first study, I had only a subjective measure of performance which I referred to as 
“job obstacles.” The data showed that at the very least employees who perceive their managers 
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as continually improving the way things are done also perceive fewer job obstacles (which may 
be beneficial to an organization in itself). Study #3 supports this finding by showing that 
continual improvement (still as perceived by the employees) has an impact on monthly sales in 
dollars. Then we saw that a manager’s own self-rating of using employee voice (to get even 
further away from a potential single-source bias) is positively and significantly related to sales.. 
Using two different sources of data (the objective sales measure and the manager’s own self-
rating) lends additional support to the notion that managers’ openness to trying new ideas 
improves performance.   
10. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 While the results may help us argue that managers can impact performance in ways that 
economic models don’t generally measure, more research is needed to confirm the results. This 
research may raise more questions than it answers, creating a potentially long and healthy 
stream of future investigations. First, the next step would certainly be applying these ideas to a 
larger sample of a company with multiple units, each with its own manager and performance 
rating, or alternatively, to multiple companies within the same industry that have comparable 
performance data. We need additional evidence to see whether perceived efficiency and 
continual improvement relate to real, hard, objective performance data as was assumed here.   
 Second, we need to further investigate management humility, including whether it is a 
stable trait, or one that can be taught or influenced. If it is stable, companies must figure out how 
to find and recruit such managers. If it can be influenced, then they must figure out how to train 
various managers to become more humble leaders. Further investigations into the how and why 
of the effects of humility are also needed. Are they simply more open to taking risks, or do they 
fully appreciate the contribution of others so strongly that under this type of leadership, your 
ideas will be both appreciated and attempted? Or is it possibly a little bit of both? Humility is 
definitely an up-and-coming research area, and much still remains to be done.  
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 Also, the construct created here called “continual improvement” needs further validation 
from inclusion in other research. While I found that this construct is distinct from the other 
constructs analyzed here (and reliability was above .9), further investigations into what other 
factors besides management humility lead to higher levels of perceived continual improvement 
would be beneficial. Additionally, testing the perceived levels against more objectively captured 
measures of the same thing would be a great next step.  
 Moreover, future research using other methods may be necessary to test more causal 
inferences. More data are needed for Study #3 to see if results remain with a larger sample, and 
more experimental data can help us better understand if humility can be learned, and if so, if it 
in fact leads to better performance. Other limitations of this research include the potential same-
source bias caused by gathering all the data from the employees in Study #1 and #2. This could 
be rectified in future studies by attempting to gather additional data from multiple sources. 
 This paper may just be a piece of the very first steps trying to understand what humble 
leadership entails and whether or not it may positively impact performance through channels 
such as increasing job satisfaction and a willingness to implement new ideas. Although there is 
some support found here, it’s not entirely clear how or why. I posit that it is through the 
openness to others’ ideas and through trying new things to improve performance, but it’s also 
possible that humble leaders are more willing to empower their employees or even give them 
greater levels of autonomy, which could also positively affect performance. Future research 
should try to more fully investigate the mechanisms through which this type of leadership affects 
organizational outcomes like performance.  
 Future research should also test whether managers at different levels have varying 
impacts on performance. Apriori it may seem as though higher-level managers may have 
greater impacts on performance, but it also makes sense that lower-level managers closer to 
the employees’ processes and perhaps even closer to the customers could have a larger impact 
on some of the day-to-day things that impact performance and efficiency in the workplace.  
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 Additionally, it was found here that employee voice may only be beneficial to an 
organization when those ideas are heard with open ears by someone willing to give them a try, 
which describes a humble leader who continually makes improvements. However, further 
studies could examine whether employee voice is helpful under circumstances of other types of 
leadership as well. Although these studies explore humble leadership and provide support for its 
beneficial consequences, it’s only one piece of the first steps of this research; there is 
admittedly still much left to be done. 
 This research is by no means the end of an investigation. Rather, it is viewed as the very 
beginning. The potential directions and contributions of these ideas will hopefully generate 
inquisitive excitement and rewarding research for those interested in bridging the gaps between 
organizational theory and economic analysis. The ideas set forth here are not only important for 
firms that want to survive increasing competition and turbulent markets, but also for researchers 
who would like further empirical support for the notion that our standard economic models can 
be enhanced by the inclusion of employee and managerial behaviors. Indeed, a firm is a 
collection of people; therefore understanding firms necessarily means modeling the people 
within them. 
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ESSAY #1 TABLES 
Table 1A: Questionnaire 
 
Humility* (α=.94) 
1. This supervisor actively seeks feedback, even if it is critical 
2. This supervisor admits it when they don’t know how to do something 
3. This supervisor acknowledges when others have more knowledge and skills than 
themselves 
4. This supervisor takes notice of others’ strengths 
5. This supervisor often compliments others on their strengths 
6. This supervisor shows appreciation for the unique contributions of others 
7. This supervisor is willing to learn from others 
8. This supervisor is open to the ideas of others 
9. This supervisor open to the advice of others 
Employee Voice** (α=.89) 
1. I develop and make recommendations to this supervisor that could improve work 
processes 
2. I develop and make recommendations to this supervisor that could improve customer 
satisfaction 
3. I give suggestions about how to make this company better 
Continual Improvement** (α=.90) 
1. This supervisor continually improves the way things are done 
2. This supervisor changes how we do things to improve efficiency 
3. This supervisor changes how we do things to improve customer satisfaction 
Job Obstacles** (α=.90) 
1. Things get in the way of me offering good service to my customers 
2. Things get in the way of our customers being easily satisfied 
3. Things get in the way of me doing my job well 
Job Satisfaction*  
1. All in all, I am satisfied with my job  
Change Ability** (α=.87) 
1. This supervisor is able to make changes to improve the way we do things 
2. This supervisor is able make changes to improve our customer satisfaction 
Power Distance* (α=.76) 
1. It is better not to disagree with management decisions 
2. When this supervisor makes a decision with which I disagree I prefer to accept the 
decision rather than question it 
3. I believe that it is not right to disagree with my boss 
*Responses range 1-5 from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” 
**Responses range 1-5 from “Never” to “Always” 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Table 2A: Summary Statistics Study #1 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Job Satisfaction 3.68 1.01 1 5 
Job Obstacles 2.97 1.02 1 5 
Humility 3.63 .951 1 5 
Continual Improvement 3.15 .978 1 5 
Change Ability (CA) 3.67 1.05 1 5 
Employee Voice 3.25 1.02 1 5 
Power Distance (PD) 2.68 .844 1 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3A: Correlation Matrix 
 
  (1)    (2)     (3)    (4)   (5)   (6) (7) 
         
(1) Employee Voice  1.00       
(2) Manager Humility  0.38  1.00      
(3) Mgr. Able to Make Changes  0.22  0.24  1.00     
(4) Power Distance -0.44 -0.30 -0.06  1.00    
(5) Continual Improvement  0.34  0.55  0.51 -0.16  1.00   
(6) Job Obstacles -0.06 -0.27 -0.34  0.13 -0.40  1.00  
(7) Job Satisfaction  0.27  0.41  0.34 -0.24  0.38 -0.48 1.00 
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Table 4A: 3SLS Estimated System of Equations: Original Model 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Voice (Eq. 1)                                                              
Mgr. Humility                                                0.379*** 
                                                            (0.056)    
 
Mgr. Able to Make Changes                                    0.115*   
                                                            (0.052)    
 
Power Distance                                              -0.311*** 
                                                            (0.057) 
 
“R-squared”               0.273 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Continual Improvement (Eq. 2)                                                        
Voice                                                        0.618*** 
                                                            (0.114)    
 
Mgr. Able to Make Changes                                    0.365*** 
                                                            (0.060)    
 
“R-squared”               0.175 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Job Obstacles (Eq. 3)                                                         
Continual Improvement                                       -0.488*** 
                                                            (0.128)    
 
Mgr. Able to Make Changes                                   -0.087   
                                                            (0.084)    
 
“R-squared”               0.167 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Job Satisfaction (Eq. 4)                                                   
Job Obstacles                                               -0.944*** 
                                                            (0.236)    
 
Mgr. Humility                                                0.257*   
                                                            (0.101)    
 
“R-squared”                 0.091 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                                                   253    
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5A: Estimation Including Humility in Continual Improvement Equation 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Voice (Eq. 1)                                                              
Mgr. Humility                                                0.235*** 
                                                            (0.062)    
 
Mgr. Able to Make Changes                                    0.141**  
                                                            (0.052)    
 
Power Distance                                              -0.412*** 
                                                            (0.060)    
 
“R-squared”               0.292 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Continual Improvement (Eq. 2)                                                        
Mgr. Humility                                                0.482*** 
                                                            (0.069)    
 
Voice                                                        0.0347    
                                                            (0.124)    
 
Mgr. Able to Make Changes                                    0.384*** 
                                                            (0.049)  
   
“R-squared”               0.463 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Job Obstacles (Eq. 3)                                                         
Continual Improvement                                       -0.454*** 
                                                            (0.129)    
 
Mgr. Able to Make Changes                                   -0.102    
                                                            (0.084)  
   
“R-squared”               0.175 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Job Satisfaction (Eq. 4)                                                   
Job Obstacles                                               -1.004*** 
                                                            (0.236)    
 
Mgr. Humility                                                0.185    
                                                            (0.102)    
   
“R-squared”               0.043 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                                                   253    
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 6A: Re-specification 
____________________________________________________________________ 
                                      (1)                     (2)    
____________________________________________________________________ 
Continual Improvement (Eq. 1)                                                       
Mgr. Humility                       0.504***                0.495*** 
                                 (0.0514)                (0.0517)    
 
Mgr. Able to Make Changes           0.332***                0.389*** 
                                 (0.0450)                (0.0462)    
 
“R-squared”              0.455                    0.459 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Voice (Eq. 2)                                                             
Mgr. Humility                       0.320***               0.0585    
                                 (0.0554)                 (0.102)    
 
Power Distance                     -0.337***               -0.406*** 
                                 (0.0573)                (0.0595)    
 
Continual Improvement                                       0.361**  
                                                          (0.136)    
   
“R-squared”             0.267               0.276 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Job Obstacles (Eq. 3)                                                         
Voice                              -0.585***               -0.190    
                                  (0.117)                 (0.131)    
 
Continual Improvement                                      -0.654*** 
                                                          (0.159)    
 
Mgr. Humility                                               0.167    
                                                          (0.118)    
   
“R-squared”             -0.246               0.038 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Job Satisfaction (Eq. 4)                                                  
Job Obstacles                      -1.449***               -0.992*** 
                                  (0.203)                 (0.236)    
 
Mgr. Humility                      0.0844                   0.188    
                                  (0.0876)                 (0.102)    
 
“R-squared”        -0.504               0.053 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                        253                     253    
__________________________________________________________________ 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Reported estimates are beta coefficients 
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Table 7A: Summary Statistics Study #2 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Top Mgr. Humility 3.61 1.04 1 5 
Lower Mgr. Humility 3.49 1.04 1 5 
Voice toward Top Mgr. 3.17 1.06 1 5 
Voice toward Lower Mgr. 3.20 1.05 1 5 
Top Mgr. Continually Improves 3.41 1.01 1 5 
Lower Mgr. Continually Improves 3.13 1.00 1 5 
Satisfaction with Top Mgr. 3.93 1.21 1 5 
Satisfaction with Lower Mgr. 3.63 1.27 1 5 
Top Mgr. is Able to Make Changes 4.06 1.00 1.5 5 
Lower Mgr. is Able to Make Changes 3.65 1.11 1 5 
Job Satisfaction 3.62 1.13 1 5 
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Table 8A: Study #2- Fixed Effects Analyses 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                    (1)    
                                                                  Voice    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Mgr. Humility                                                     0.357**  
                                                                 (0.128)    
  
Continual Improvement                                             0.0492    
                                                                 (0.140)    
 
Mgr. Able to Make Changes                                        -0.0570    
                                                                 (0.0985)    
 
Constant                                                          0.0612    
                                                                 (0.0464)    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
R-squared                                                         0.141    
Observations                                                       204 
Groups                   102    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Reported estimates are beta coefficients 
 
Table 9A: Fixed Effects Analyses on Continual Improvement 
____________________________________________________________________ 
                                      (1)                   (2)    
                                 Continual               Continual                                
                                Improvement             Improvement    
____________________________________________________________________ 
Voice                               0.203**                0.0254    
                                 (0.0729)                (0.0723)    
 
Mgr. Able to Make Changes           0.454***                0.249*** 
                                  (0.101)                (0.0664)    
 
Mgr. Humility                                               0.544*** 
                                                         (0.0784)    
 
Constant                           0.0106*                 0.0201    
                                 (0.00446)               (0.0336)    
____________________________________________________________________ 
R-squared                           0.336                   0.553    
Observations                          204                     204    
Groups         102                     102 
 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Reported estimates are beta coefficients 
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Table 10A: Separate Analyses for Different Types of Managers 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
                          “Other” Manager               “Top” Manager 
 
                          (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)    
                        Voice         Voice         Voice         Voice    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Humility                0.375***      0.174         0.263*        0.068                          
                       (0.085)       (0.129)       (0.121)       (0.150)                        
 
Mgr. Able to            0.013        -0.099        -0.025        -0.184                          
Make Changes           (0.080)       (0.098)       (0.095)       (0.112)                           
 
Power Distance         -0.072        -0.103        -0.341**      -0.330**                        
                       (0.143)       (0.142)       (0.116)       (0.111)                           
 
Continual                             0.359+                      0.368*           
Improvement                          (0.194)                     (0.153)             
 
Constant               0.020         0.010          0.058         0.053    
                      (0.076)       (0.069)        (0.083)       (0.083)    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
R-squared              0.133         0.177          0.207         0.239    
Observations            117           117            104           104    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Reported estimates are beta coefficients 
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Table 11A: (Different) Manager's Humility and Continual Improvement on Voice toward (“Wrong”) 
Manager 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
                                   (1)             (2)           (3)    
                             Voice Toward     Voice Toward  Voice Toward 
                              Top Manager    Other Manager  Other Manager    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Other Mgr. Humility            -0.0857                           
                                (0.15)                          
 
Other Manager                    0.121                          0.313*            
Continually Improves             0.15)                          (0.12)             
 
Other Mgr. is Able      0.0748                                    
to Make Changes                 (0.14)                                    
 
Power Distance with            -0.0875                                    
Other Manager                   (0.11)                                    
 
Top Mgr. Humility                               -0.262+         -0.242+   
                                                (0.14)          (0.12)    
 
Top Manager                                      0.681***        0.555** 
Continually Improves                            (0.16)          (0.16)    
 
Top Mgr. is Able                                -0.251+         -0.280*   
to Make Changes                                 (0.13)          (0.14)    
 
Power Distance with                            -0.0922          -0.0947    
Top Manager                                     (0.14)          (0.14)    
 
Constant                        0.0229          0.0474           0.0388    
                               (0.082)         (0.081)          (0.084)    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
R-squared                        0.023           0.152           0.235     
Observations                       107             104             104    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Reported estimates are beta coefficients 
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Table 12A: Effects of Continual Improvement, Voice and Change-ability on Perceived Job 
Obstacles 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                           (1)                     (2)    
                                 Job Obstacles           Job Obstacles    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Voice Toward “Other” Mgr.              -0.157+                  -0.013    
                                      (0.081)                  (0.067)    
 
“Other” Mgr. Able                      -0.301**                 -0.015    
  to Make Changes                     (0.094)                  (0.094)    
 
Voice Toward “Top” Mgr.                 0.081                    0.037    
                                       (0.064)                  (0.061)    
 
“Top” Mgr. Able                        -0.331***                -0.240*   
  to Make Changes                     (0.079)                   (0.110)    
 
“Other” Mgr.                                                    -0.528*** 
  Continually Improves                                          (0.093)    
 
“Top” Mgr.                                                      -0.015    
  Continually Improves                                          (0.143)    
 
Constant                               -0.103                   -0.095    
                                      (0.090)                   (0.077)    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
R-squared                                0.345                   0.481    
Observations                               104                     104    
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Reported estimates are beta coefficients 
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Table 13A: Summary Statistics- Study #3 Brand 1 (Brand=0) 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Avg. Voice Rating 11 3.42 0.68 2.33 5.00 
Avg. Humility Rating 11 4.00 0.55 2.50 4.72 
Avg. Continual Improvement Rating 11 3.89 0.59 2.33 4.50 
Mgr. Able to Make Changes 11 4.44 0.31 3.83 5.00 
Power Distance 11 2.71 0.72 1.67 3.86 
July 2014 Sales 11 $48,045 $14,617 $32,085 $84,192 
 
 
Table 14A: Summary Statistics- Study #3 Brand 2 (Brand=1) 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Avg. Voice Rating 8 2.98 0.39 2.33 3.42 
Avg. Humility Rating 8 3.70 0.37 3.22 4.33 
Avg. Continual Improvement Rating 8 3.45 0.41 2.97 4.11 
Mgr. Able to Make Changes 8 3.89 0.54 3.30 5.00 
Power Distance 8 2.93 0.30 2.44 3.33 
July 2014 Sales 8 $70,233 $12,896 $56,104 $91,896 
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Table 15A: 3SLS Using Firm Data 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Continual Improvement (Eq. 1)                                                
Humility                                                      0.869*** 
                                                             (0.14)    
 
Mgr. is Able to Make Changes                                  0.245+   
                                                             (0.13)    
 
Constant                                                     -0.064     
                                                            (0.071)    
“R-squared”                                                   0.889 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Voice (Eq. 2)                                                              
Continual Improvement                                         0.961+   
                                                             (0.49)    
 
Power Distance                                               -0.584**  
                                                             (0.21)    
 
Mgr. is Able to Make Changes                                 -0.587    
                                                             (0.47)    
 
Constant                                                    -0.0725    
                                                              (0.20)     
“R-squared”                                   0.385 
______________________________________________________________________ 
July 2014 Sales (Eq. 3)                                                                                                 
Continual Improvement                                         0.724*   
                                                             (0.29)    
 
Brand1                                                        2.202**  
                                                             (0.71)    
 
Constant                                                     -0.956*   
                                                             (0.38)    
“R-squared”                                                   0.442 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Job Satisfaction (Eq. 4)                                                   
July 2014 Sales              0.714**  
                                                             (0.26)    
 
Brand1                                                       -1.701**  
                                                             (0.51)    
 
Constant                                                      0.774**  
                                                              (0.24)    
“R-squared”                                   0.462 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                                                    19    
______________________________________________________________________ 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Reported estimates are beta coefficients 
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Table 16A: 3SLS Using Manager's Own Self-Rating of Using Employee Voice 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Continual Improvement (Eq. 1)                                              
Humility                                                     0.872*** 
                                                            (0.16)    
 
Mgr. is Able to Make Changes                                 0.247+   
                                                            (0.15)    
 
“R-squared”                                                  0.900 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Voice (Eq. 2)                                                             
Continual Improvement                                        1.074*   
                                                            (0.53)    
 
Power Distance                                              -0.441    
                                                            (0.27)    
 
Mgr. is Able to Make Changes                                -0.725    
                                                            (0.50)    
 
“R-squared”                                  0.341 
______________________________________________________________________ 
July 2014 Sales (Eq. 3)                                                                                                 
Manager’s Self-Rating of                                     0.807*   
Using Employee Voice                                        (0.39)    
 
Continual Improvement                                        0.547*   
                                                            (0.24)    
 
Brand1                                                       2.723**  
                                                            (0.91)    
 
Constant                                                    -3.963*   
                                                            (1.64)    
“R-squared”                                                  0.522 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Job Satisfaction (Eq. 4)                                                  
July 2014 Sales                                              0.442    
                                                            (0.30)    
 
Brand1                                                      -1.153*   
                                                            (0.48)    
 
Constant                                                     0.525*   
                                                            (0.24)    
“R-squared”                                                  0.449 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Observations                                                   15    
______________________________________________________________________ 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Reported estimates are beta coefficients 
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ESSAY #2: EXAMINING THE IMPACTS OF DIFFERENT ANTI-MALARIA CAMPAIGNS: ARE 
SOME ORGANIZATIONS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN OTHERS? THE CASE IN NIGERIA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 In the year 2010, there were an estimated 655,000 deaths related to malaria, with 
approximately 86% of these deaths occurring in children under 5 years of age (WHO, 2011). 
However these deaths could be prevented with the proper implementation of recommended 
interventions (WHO, 2011). Since 1998 when Roll Back Malaria was founded, many countries 
have received assistance and funding from various organizations to help fight malaria 
prevalence, morbidity and mortality. However, countries are experiencing varying levels of 
success in terms of reducing mortality and encouraging preventive behaviors. The question then 
becomes: to what extent can the varying levels of success be explained by which organization 
is in charge of the anti-malaria campaign serving the area? For instance, is the World Bank 
Booster program more effective than UNICEF at carrying out the same mission? And is the 
World Bank more effective when they work alongside the National Malaria Control Programme 
or when they work with other NGOs?  
 Because malaria is transmitted through nocturnal mosquitos, one effective way to 
prevent and avoid the disease is by sleeping under a bed net (Sexton, 2011). Data from Nigeria 
are collected from various sources and analyzed using a distributed lag model to assess first 
whether having any campaign in your state impacts the probability that the household owns a 
bed net and then second, whether these impacts are long lasting or short lived. The same is 
then done using net usage as the dependent variable. Results show that various campaigns do 
in fact have varying degrees of success in increasing net usage and some have longer lasting 
effects than others. For example, children under five in states whose campaigns were covered 
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by organizations funded by the Global Fund within the past 12 months are 25 percentage points 
more likely to have been sleeping under a net the night preceding the survey. This achievement 
beats out the same type of children in states whose campaigns were covered by the World 
Bank working with the National Malaria Control Programme (NMCP) and those covered by other 
NGOs not funded by the Global Fund. Net usage is also somewhat sustained at higher levels in 
these states over the next 3-year period, but some of the other campaigns fail to maintain the 
increase in net usage over time. We also see no real differences in net ownership changes 
across the various campaigns, although all achieve an increase over those states that had no 
anti-malaria campaign prior to the most recent 2013 survey.  
2. MOTIVATION 
 In the year 2010, there were an estimated 655,000 deaths related to malaria, with 
approximately 86% of these deaths occurring in children under 5 years of age (WHO, 2011). 
Additionally, these deaths are not distributed evenly across the globe. In fact, 85% of malaria-
related deaths occur within Africa (RBM, 2005) and 16% of deaths occurring in children under 5 
in this region (1 out of every 6) can be attributed to malaria (WHO, 2008a). The reality is, 
however, that these deaths can be prevented with the proper implementation of recommended 
interventions (WHO, 2011). 
 Because this burden is both large and avoidable, four international agencies (WHO, 
UNICEF, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme) came together in 
1998 and started the Roll Back Malaria campaign. The primary focus of this campaign is on 
reducing malaria-related mortality and morbidity by providing the resources required to make a 
difference. Although malaria incidence has been declining over the last decade due to these 
efforts (WHO, 2011), it is estimated that over 3.3 billion people (close to half of the world’s 
population) remain at risk (RBM, 2008), with an estimated 247 million cases in one year alone 
(WHO, 2008b). 
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 Throughout the decade following the Roll Back Malaria’s founding, many countries have 
received assistance and funding from various organizations. However, different countries and 
different anti-malaria campaigns are having different levels of success. In Nigeria for example, 
different organizations are operating across different states. These different states are 
experiencing varying levels of compliance with recommended preventive behaviors, and varying 
levels of access to particular preventative measures. Therefore, Nigeria offers a unique 
opportunity to examine whether the varying levels of success may be explained by who is in 
charge. For example, are NGOs such as the Society for Family and Health (SFH) more or less 
effective than the campaigns driven by the larger organizations such as the World Bank 
Boosters Program or UNICEF? In some cases, it may be argued that larger organizations have 
to deal with greater levels of bureaucracy and “red tape” and local organizations are more 
familiar with the lay of the land. On the other hand, economies of scale may give the larger 
organizations a comparative advantage. In this paper, I explore whether different organizations 
are achieving varying levels of success in terms of increasing both ownership and usage of 
mosquito nets. Because malaria is transmitted through nocturnal mosquitos, one effective way 
to prevent and avoid the disease is by sleeping under a bed net (Sexton, 2011). In fact, many 
campaigns now focus solely on the distribution of these nets. Using a distributed lag model, I 
am able to test whether the effects of these campaigns wear off over time and whether different 
campaigns see longer lasting impacts than others.  
 Data are combined from various sources such as the Demographic Health Surveys 
(DHS); Malaria Indicator Surveys (MIS); Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS); and 
Nigeria’s Yakubu Gowon Center and are analyzed using various econometric strategies in order 
to assess whether particular organizations are in fact achieving intended results, and whether 
some organizations are doing this better than others. We need a better understanding as to 
which organizations are the most successful at reducing malaria-related burdens so that we can 
ensure this enormous battle is fought both efficiently and effectively to prevent the hundreds of 
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thousands of unnecessary deaths that are occurring year after year. The paper is organized as 
follows: Section 3 gives a background on malaria, various anti-malaria campaigns and on the 
situation in Nigeria in particular. Section 4 details the research strategy, Section 5 discusses the 
results, and the paper concludes with a discussion on the limitations of this research and 
potential directions for future analyses. 
3. BACKGROUND ON MALARIA 
 Malaria is caused by the bite of a mosquito carrying the parasite Plasmodium. When the 
parasites affect the red blood cells, malaria-related symptoms can occur for those lacking 
immunity or those with weak immune systems, and transmission through blood (to unborn 
children in pregnant women, for example) is also possible. Then, when an uninfected mosquito 
feeds off of the infected human, that mosquito contracts the parasites, and then passes it on to 
its next victim. This continuous cycle of malaria transmission can be controlled, but various and 
extant resources as well as country- or even continent-level commitments are required for 
successful reduction or eradication. Because of this, numerous multi-organization and multi-
country campaigns have been created within the past 20 years, with a focus on reducing and 
eventually eliminating malaria-related burdens.  
 3.1 The Creation of Various Anti-Malaria Campaigns 
 In 1998, the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) campaign was created by four international 
organizations joining together with one primary focus: reducing and eventually eliminating 
malaria. Since then, the RBM Partnership has developed to include more than 500 partners, 
including malaria-endemic countries, their bilateral and multilateral development partners, the 
private sector, nongovernmental and community-based organizations, foundations, and 
research and academic institutions (RBM). In 2000, an African Summit on Roll Back Malaria 
was held in Abuja, Nigeria, where 44 of the 50 malaria-affected countries called for a 
commitment to implement RBM’s strategies and halve Africa’s malaria-related mortality by 2010 
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(RBM, 2004). This commitment, called the Abuja Declaration and Plan of action detailed the 
various strategies that were to be carried out by all participating countries and called on the 
international community to help provide the necessary resources required to overcome this 
overwhelming challenge.  
 In the year 2000, 189 nations across the globe put forth the Millennium Declaration 
outlining eight ‘Millennium Development Goals.’ These goals include a reduction in malaria, 
HIV/AIDS and other diseases, as well as a reduction in any-cause mortality for children under 5. 
In 2002, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) was created to help 
accumulate the resources required for these goals and to direct them to those in need. The 
GFATM awards grants to countries who successfully apply for additional resources that will help 
increase activities found to combat these diseases. For example, grants have been awarded to 
increase access to and distribute bed nets and other preventative commodities across various 
countries, and provide education or mass-marketing campaigns to increase awareness of the 
causes and treatments of these diseases. In 2005, the World Bank got more heavily involved by 
establishing funds for various initiatives across Africa in what they called the World Bank 
Booster campaign. Also in 2005, the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) was launched as a five-
year, $1.2 billion expansion of U.S. Government resources to reduce malaria-related burdens 
and help relieve poverty across Africa (PMI, 2009). The Millennium Development Goals, 
together with the RBM partnership, the World Bank, the Global Fund and the PMI all show an 
increased world-wide commitment to strengthening developing countries and reducing the 
health-related burdens that affect these countries the most. 
3.3 Anti-Malaria Campaigns In Nigeria 
 97% of Nigeria’s population is at risk for malaria (United States Embassy in Nigeria, 
2011) and transmission occurs year-round (National Population Commission (NPC) [Nigeria] 
and ICF International, 2014). In terms of relative prevalence, Nigeria accounted for32 percent of 
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the global estimate of 655,000 malaria deaths in 2010 (World Health Organization, 2012 as 
cited in DHS 2013). Malaria is also a leading cause of death of children under age five in Nigeria 
(National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2013). These statistics especially highlight the importance 
of studying Nigeria in particular when analyzing the effectiveness of anti-malarial campaigns.  
 The 2009-2013 National Malaria Control Strategic Plans (NMCSP) saw approximately 
60 million long-lasting insecticide-treated nets (LLINs) distributed across Nigeria through the 
work of various organizations and a “massive influx of resources from donors” (National 
Population Commission (NPC) [Nigeria] and ICF International, 2014). Nigeria had previously 
implemented a 2006-2010 strategy targeting only the most at-risk populations (pregnant women 
and children under five) but in 2008 this strategic plan was revised (and set to cover 2009-2013) 
to instead reach all people living in malaria-endemic areas. Because of this, some states had 
previously seen bed net distribution campaigns. However, the massive scale-up between 2009 
and 2013 will be the focus in this research, and net ownership and usage prior to this period will 
be controlled for in the analyses. 
 Between the years of 2009 and 2013, several “lead partners” were involved in bed net 
distribution across the various states of Nigeria. The World Bank Booster program, who had 
been a major partner in setting up for some of the earlier distributions, worked without the 
NMCP prior to 2011 (in campaigns across seven states) but then worked with them for most 
campaigns occurring in and after 2011 (in 17 states including those carried out after collection of 
the 2013 data). UNICEF was also a lead partner in five different states, NGOs funded by the 
Global Fund carried out campaigns in four of the states and finally NGOs funded by sources 
other than the Global Fund were active in the four remaining states. This research attempts to 
shed light on whether some lead partners were more effective than other at achieving bed net 
ownership and usage, controlling for general time trends affecting all states and also for state-
level fixed effects.   
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3.4 Strategies of Anti-Malaria Campaigns  
 Because malaria is transmitted through nocturnal mosquitos, one effective way to 
prevent and avoid the disease is by sleeping under a bed net (Sexton, 2011). In fact, many 
campaigns now focus solely on the distribution of these nets. For example, between 2008 and 
2010, 289 million long-lasting insecticide-treated nets (LLINs) were distributed, which was 
enough to cover almost 80% of the at-risk population in sub-Saharan Africa (RBM, 2011). While 
it is known that those most susceptible to death from malaria are children and pregnant women, 
the latest goals of the anti-malaria campaigns in Africa now include covering all at-risk 
populations (not just women and children), since spillover effects can be achieved with more 
extensive coverage (RBM, 2008). Additionally, some campaigns’ goals include ensuring the 
availability of Artemisinin Combination Therapies (ACTs) and intermittent preventive treatment 
in pregnancies (IPTp), indoor-residual spraying, and demand creation for bed nets. Attempts are 
now being made across the globe to “scale up” these intervention programs in an attempt to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goal related to malaria by the year 2015.  
 Bed nets treated with an insecticide (ITNs) can be highly effective at reducing mortality 
(see, for example, Lengeler (2004)) since mosquitos are both unable to penetrate the net and 
die after coming into contact with one. A reduction in the number of mosquitos that can transmit 
malaria parasites from person to person can help aid in the reduction of malaria-related 
mortality and morbidity. Of course, if more people are protected by bed nets, it is less likely they 
will contract the disease in the first place, also reducing the chances that the surviving 
mosquitos don’t pick it up to pass along to another person. Additionally, there are “long-lasting 
insecticide-treated nets” (LLINs), which last a full 3 years without needing re-treatment (CDC). 
Massive campaigns to distribute these LLINs across sub-Saharan Africa have shown great but 
varying levels of success.  
 The biggest problem leading to lack of bed net usage has always been both access and 
understanding, where those without access to bed nets certainly won’t sleep under one, but 
56 
 
those without an understanding or appreciation of its life-saving benefits are also highly unlikely 
to use it. Therefore, in addition to increasing access through mass distribution, many campaigns 
have also focused on demand creation with mass-marketing campaigns teaching citizens that 
sleeping under bed nets can help save both children and pregnant women’s lives.    
 There are not only various programs that exist to achieve these goals, but there are also 
various strategies being implemented by the organizations in charge to achieve their goals. 
What I propose to investigate is whether some organizations are experiencing better returns to 
their resources in terms of achieving higher levels of coverage of effective preventive behaviors. 
This is only the first step- if we observe that varying levels of success are occurring across the 
various organizations involved in the fight against malaria, then the next step is to try to figure 
out why. This call for future research underscores the need and urgency with which both local 
and international organizations must act. We need to discover which organizations are most 
capable of achieving these outcomes so that we can start to understand if their greater success 
is due to their strategies, their organizational structure or something else entirely. Once we 
know what works, we may be able to not only save more lives and give people a better chance 
at living longer, more productive lives, but we may also reduce the amount of wasted resources 
given to inferior organizations that seem to be unable to achieve the same goals.  
4. RESEARCH STRATEGY   
 Although many countries within sub-Saharan Africa have implemented various anti-
malaria campaigns, this research focuses solely on the situation in Nigeria. First, it’s easier to 
see what factors might be leading to differences in the success rates of different campaigns 
when focusing on just one country. This allows you to exploit the variation within the country 
while holding constant for all states many of the country-level variables that could be having an 
effect. Second, Nigeria conveniently has data related to which state had which organization 
leading the anti-malaria campaign within it. For various reasons, the campaigns in some states 
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were led by the World Bank Boosters program (WB) working alongside the National Malaria 
Control Programme (NMCP) and in other states, the NMCP was absent and the World Bank 
worked with other NGOs. Still other states’ campaigns were led by UNICEF, and the rest were 
headed by NGOs funded by the Global Fund. This country then provides a unique opportunity to 
assess whether different organizations are experiencing different levels of effectiveness in terms 
of mosquito net ownership and usage, and to see whether the differences can be attributed to 
the organizations in charge.   
 Once the question of whether different campaigns are experiencing different levels of 
success has been answered, more research will need to be conducted using additional 
countries within sub-Saharan Africa to see if the results generalize beyond Nigeria. If we can 
explain differences in impacts by differences in strategies or other organizational characteristics 
across many different countries, we may be able to fight the fight against malaria with fewer, yet 
more efficiently-utilized and effective resources. Since this is such a difficult fight with extremely 
significant consequences and resources are limited, this should be the goal of any research 
related to the anti-malaria campaigns that are trying to reduce infant and child mortality across 
the continent. Of course, the first step is to assess whether heterogeneity can in fact be seen in 
the data.   
4.1 Data Description 
 Data on net ownership and usage are obtained from the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS), Malaria Indicator Surveys (MIS) and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS). 
Specifically, I use DHS Nigeria 2003, DHS Nigeria 2008, MIS Nigeria 2010, MICS Nigeria 2011 
and DHS Nigeria 2013. Because data are also collected on state of residence for each 
household, I am able to merge these separate data sets together to create state-level pooled 
cross-section data. In the analyses for net ownership, I use household level data since each 
household reported whether or not they own a bed net. For the net usage analyses, I “re-
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shaped” the DHS and MIS women data set to create one line per child under the age of five. 
This allowed all relevant household and women variables to remain attached to each child 
observation. I then appended these data to the MICS data set, which was already one line per 
child under five. All control variables (whether the household had electricity, was in an urban 
area, the number of members and members under five, and the highest level of the mother’s 
education) were also obtained from these same data sets. The list of available data sets is 
provided in  
Table 17A, as well as information on the number of observations in each.  
 The Yakubu Gowon Center was also instrumental in providing data for this research. 
They put together a detailed report of which organization(s) led the campaigns in each state and 
the month and year that the campaign was carried out. This information was used to create the 
data related to which organization was in charge and the timing of each campaign. (See Table 
18A for a description of when campaigns were involved in each state.) 
4.2 Empirical Specification- Net Ownership 
 As stated above, the data span 10 years, and variables are measured at both the 
household and person level. Creating a pooled cross-section data set and using both time and 
state fixed effects, as well as a linear state-level time trend, we can assess first whether having 
any campaign increases the likelihood of your household owning a bed net, controlling for things 
such as whether your household is in an urban area, whether it has electricity, the highest level 
of education achieved by the mother in the household, and the number of members, women 
and children under 5 in the household. We can also see if the effect of having a campaign in 
your state wears off over time by using a distributed lag model. The first model is specified as 
follows:  
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𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛿1𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝛿3𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠(𝑡−2) + 𝛿4𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠(𝑡−3) +
𝛽𝑿 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜃𝑠𝜇𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡                                           (1)  
 
Where 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡 takes the value one or zero for whether household 𝑖 in state 𝑠 owns any type 
of bed net at time 𝑡. 𝛿1 will measure whether having a campaign in the state 12 months or less 
prior to the survey (here, denoted as 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠𝑡) increases the likelihood that the household 
owns a net, relative to those living in states that did not have a campaign between 2009 and the 
time of data collection in 2013. 𝛿2 will measure the effect of having a campaign 13-24 months 
prior to the survey (here, denoted as 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠(𝑡−1)) on bed net ownership (again, relative to 
the baseline group who had no campaign). 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠(𝑡−2) represents that a campaign was in 
the state 25-36 months prior to the survey, and 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠(𝑡−3) represents that the campaign 
was in the state more than 36 months prior to the survey3.  𝑿𝒊𝒔𝒕 contains the controls listed 
above (and a vector of ones to estimate an intercept), 𝜇𝑠 represents the state-level fixed effects, 
𝜇𝑡 is a set of year dummies (𝑡=2003, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013) and 𝜃𝑠 will estimate a linear state-
level time trend for each state 𝑠. Note also that the standard errors will be clustered at the year, 
                                               
3
 To illustrate, Table 18A shows that Adamawa had a campaign headed by UNICEF in 2010. This 
campaign was carried out in August of that year (months of campaigns are not shown in order to keep the 
table brief). Nigeria had MIS survey data collected in December of 2010, and UNICEF collected MICS 
survey data in Feb of 2011. DHS survey data were collected again in April of 2013. Therefore households 
in Adamawa surveyed in 2010 will be given a value of 1 for 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛
𝑡
. Additionally, households 
surveyed in Adamawa in 2011 will also be given a value of 1 for 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛
𝑡
 since the campaign was 
fewer than 12 months prior to the 2011 survey. (Note that this is the case for many of the campaigns 
carried out in 2010, due to the fact that the 2010 and 2011 surveys were conducted within 6 months of 
each other.)  𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛
𝑡
 will have a value of 0 for 2003, 2008 and 2013 since a campaign was not 
conducted within 12 months prior to the survey in any of those years. Households surveyed in 2013 will 
take a value of 1 for 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛
𝑡−2
 because April 2013 was 25-36 months after the campaign and 
𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛
𝑡−1
 and 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛
𝑡−3
 will take a value of zero for all years.   
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state and cluster level since the households residing in the same cluster and state in the same 
year are not independent of one another. 
 After assessing the effects over time on any campaign being conducted within the state, 
it’s possible to split the different campaigns and estimate their effects separately. We can then 
test whether certain campaigns are producing better or worse results than others. Each of the 
various campaigns in Nigeria was carried out in states chosen specifically by the campaign. 
While the lack of random assignment makes it difficult to truly control for all potentially 
confounding factors, it is hoped that the state-level fixed effects can help test whether different 
campaigns are more or less effective than others, since this econometric strategy effectively 
controls for all state-level (time-invariant) variables that may cause omitted variable bias in the 
estimates. However, as mentioned above, there are not many state-level variables (either time-
invariant or time-varying) thought to be correlated with both campaign activity and bed net 
ownership. This is especially true since universal coverage was the goal, with no regard to the 
population’s levels of wealth, education or even risk level. The states’ campaigns were 
categorized as follows: World Bank Boosters (WB) working with the National Malaria Control 
Programme (NMCP), the WB working without the NMCP (often alongside other NGOs), 
campaigns with UNICEF acting as the lead partner, campaigns led by NGOs funded by the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and finally those campaigns 
headed by other NGOs. Note that this list is both mutually exclusive and exhaustive in that 
every state belongs either to one of the groups (and only one) or had no campaign prior to the 
collection of the 2013 data. Each campaign will also have the lagged values as in the model 
above. The specification is as follows:  
 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛿1𝑊𝐵 & 𝑁𝑀𝐶𝑃𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛿4𝑊𝐵 & 𝑁𝑀𝐶𝑃𝑡−3 + 𝛿5𝑊𝐵 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑁𝑀𝐶𝑃𝑡 + ⋯ 
+ 𝛿8𝑊𝐵 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑁𝑀𝐶𝑃𝑡−3 + 𝛿9𝑈𝑁𝐼𝐶𝐸𝐹𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛿12𝑈𝑁𝐼𝐶𝐸𝐹𝑡−3 + 𝛿13𝐺𝐹𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑡 + ⋯ 
+ 𝛿16𝐺𝐹𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑡−3 + 𝛿17𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛿4𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠𝑡−3 +  𝛽𝑿 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜃𝑠𝜇𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡        (2)  
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where 𝑿 contains the same controls as in (1) and both fixed effects and the state-level time 
trends are included. This specification allows us to test not only whether the effects of individual 
campaigns are wearing off over time, but also whether some campaigns are having stronger 
impacts than others and whether some are having longer-lasting effects than others.  
4.3 Empirical Specification- Net Usage 
 The above specifications use data at the household level to assess campaigns’ effects 
on bed net ownership. The DHS, MIS and MICS data also allow us to test whether campaigns 
are impacting net usage in children under 5, one of the most at-risk populations for malaria-
related mortality. The specifications are identical to those above, except the dependent variable 
is now net usage, and the standard errors are now clustered at the year, state, cluster and 
household level since multiple individual observations can come from within the same 
household. Net usage takes on the value 1 for those children under 5 who were reported to 
have slept under a mosquito net the night prior to the survey and a value of zero otherwise. The 
specifications are as follows:  
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛿1𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑡−2 + 𝛿4𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑡−3 + 𝛽𝑿 +
𝜇𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜃𝑠𝜇𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡                  (3)  
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛿1𝑊𝐵 & 𝑁𝑀𝐶𝑃𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛿4𝑊𝐵 & 𝑁𝑀𝐶𝑃𝑡−3 + 𝛿5𝑊𝐵 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑁𝑀𝐶𝑃𝑡 + ⋯ 
+ 𝛿8𝑊𝐵 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑁𝑀𝐶𝑃𝑡−3 + 𝛿9𝑈𝑁𝐼𝐶𝐸𝐹𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛿12𝑈𝑁𝐼𝐶𝐸𝐹𝑡−3 + 𝛿13𝐺𝐹𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑡 + ⋯ 
+ 𝛿16𝐺𝐹𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑡−3 + 𝛿17𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛿4𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠𝑡−3 +  𝛽𝑿 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜃𝑠𝜇𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡        (4)  
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Like the one above, this specification will allow us to test both whether there are lagged effects 
of campaigns on net usage, but also whether different campaigns are having varying impacts.  
The results are described and discussed in the Section 5.  
5. RESULTS 
 The appendix includes both tables and box plots of the estimated coefficients. The 
tables are included for those who prefer to see the estimates, but the box plots give a much 
better visualization of differences across the campaigns and whether the effects are long-lasting 
so they will be the topic of discussion in this results section.  
 Figure 3A shows the declining impact of campaigns over time on net ownership. The 
effect of having a campaign within the past 12 months preceding a survey is significantly 
different (at the 5% level) from the effect of having a campaign more than 12 months ago, and 
this effect is also different from the effects more than 2 years ago (although the effect of having 
a campaign 25-36 months ago is not statistically different from having one more than 36 months 
ago. We see the same general trend in Figure 4A, although some campaigns seem to have 
longer-lasting effects than others (as shown by the consistently high GFATM estimates up 
through 25-36 months ago). We can see from this figure that there aren’t statistically different 
impacts of individual campaigns on net ownership when comparing campaigns that were 
conducted within the same time period preceding a survey. (One possible exception is the 
GFATM within the past 12 month’s estimate, which appears to be statistically different from the 
estimate for “other NGOs” and slightly higher than the estimate for campaigns led by UNICEF. 
However, within the other time frames, all individual campaign estimates seem to overlap. This 
seems to suggest that net ownership is achieved somewhat equally and doesn’t vary due to 
differences in campaign management. We will see somewhat different results when comparing 
estimates on net usage.  
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Figures 5A through 9A show the lagged impacts for each individual campaign. It’s worth 
noting that campaigns led by NGOs funded by the Global Fund and NGOs funded in other ways 
(usually sets of international donors) both seem to have the longest-lasting impact on net 
ownership. The other three campaigns’ effects at 25-36 months ago are statistically lower than 
the campaigns’ effects within the first 12 months. It’s also worth noting that only one campaign 
(the WB working without the NMCP) sees net ownership that is statistically different from zero 
even after 36 months or more have passed. All other campaigns’ states see no better net 
ownership after 3 years than states that have had no campaign at all.  
Table 20A then presents the estimates for net usage when any campaign has been in 
the state within the past. Again, the discussion will focus on the 95% confidence intervals 
presented in the figures. The effect of campaigns on net usage drops more dramatically than 
net ownership, suggesting that although people may retain ownership of their nets they reduce 
their usage. This could perhaps be due to the wear and tear of nets, since a net with tears fails 
to achieve its purpose. People may hold onto them and report owning one because they may 
plan on sewing the net or repairing it in the future but aren’t continuing its use. Alternatively, it 
could be that the commitment to use the nets spikes right after the campaign because of the 
behavioral change communication the campaigns attempts, but then this wears off once the 
campaign has been gone for a while.  
 Figure 11A shows the same general trend although again we see the GF NGOs 
maintaining the longest-lasting impact. We also see differences among the campaigns in this  , 
where the GF NGOs impact net usage statistically more than both NGOs funded by other 
means and the WB working with the NMCP. When looking at 13-24 months after a campaign, 
the GF NGOs outperform UNICEF and the WB with the NMCP. After 25 months, the GF NGOs 
outperform everyone, and the same is true for greater than 36 months except for NGOs funded 
by other means. (More on NGOs funded by donors other than the Global Fund below.) 
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 Figures 12A through 16A show the lagged effects net usage for each individual 
campaign. As discussed above, states with campaigns led by NGOs funded by the Global Fund 
do a pretty great job at sustaining net usage. There are no statistical differences in net usage 
between time lags of 13-24 months, 25-36 and even greater than 36 months, although they do 
experience the highest increase in net usage within their first 12 months.  
 There were no states with the WB & NMCP having conducted campaigns more than 36 
months ago, but you can see a great decline in net usage. In fact, once 2 years have passed, 
states that had this group leading the campaign have less net usage than states with no 
campaigns4. States where the WB worked with groups other than the NMCP also reduce their 
net usage dramatically after 2 years. States with UNICEF as the lead partner see a large 
decline in net usage after only the first year.   
 Figure 16A shows net usage in states whose campaigns were led by NGOs funded by 
donors other than the Global Fund. We see an odd result where it appears that the effect 36 
months after the campaign is larger than the effect 2-3 years after. This is due somewhat to the 
fact that two states (Ekiti and Ogun) had their campaigns in 2010, so had a value of 1 for 
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑡, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑡−1, and 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑡−3. These two states maintain a somewhat higher 
level of net usage across all four years. However Zamfara, the only state with a value of 1 for 
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑡−2 , has a low level of net usage in 2013, the year for which this value is 1. However, 
one thing we do learn from this figure is that usage stays somewhat consistent in the three other 
states.  A full discussion of these results, along with policy implications, is discussed in Section 
6. 
6. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 This research casts light not only on the impact of anti-malaria campaigns on net 
ownership and net usage, but also on whether the effects of campaigns last even after the 
                                               
4
 Of course, net ownership and usage was not zero for states with no campaigns prior to the 2013 survey.  
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campaigns are conducted. The general finding is that net ownership is heavily impacted by 
campaigns (as to be expected) and that ownership doesn’t quite return to levels consistent with 
having no campaign even after the campaigns have been gone for several years. This means 
that campaigns are in fact having positive impact on mosquito net ownership and that although 
ownership does decline over time once the campaigns have left, those states covered by a 
campaign still see higher rates of ownership three years following the campaign than those 
states with no campaign at all. However, we see a somewhat different result when looking at net 
usage. This has several policy implications. First, behavioral change communication will need to 
stress the continued care and usage of mosquito nets. In fact, there is currently work being 
done to do just that by an organization called Networks, which is funded by USAID and the 
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 
(http://www.networksmalaria.org/networks/nigeria). Additionally, the durability of nets is 
extremely important if funding doesn’t allow for campaigns to re-visit states (or countries) every 
2-3 years (estimated length of net durability is around 3 years).  
 Since net usage also spikes immediately after campaigns, this implies that malaria 
prevalence may in fact be able to be reduced by these campaigns. Since malaria is spread from 
a mosquito biting an infected human and then infecting another, if the usage of nets reduces the 
number of people initially catching malaria and even kills the mosquitos that come into contact 
with the nets, overall prevalence of malaria may be reduced even though net usage falls after 
the first year.  
 Additionally, since we do see somewhat different levels and longevity of impacts across 
campaigns headed by different organizations, it may be important for different organizations to 
increase their communication with other campaigns so that best methods and practices are 
learned and spread across both states and countries (and even continents). However, there is 
still work to be done in better understanding the different impacts and the results of this 
research. The limitations and ideas for future research are discussed in the section that follows.  
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7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 As mentioned throughout the paper, if these results truly represent the differences in 
results achieved by various organizations, the next step is to find out how, or why. Could these 
differences be due to differences in strategies, organizational structures, leadership styles, or 
some other factor? More research could be helpful in assessing whether these particular 
organizations actually differ on these dimensions, or if it’s simply a story of who manufactures 
the nets purchased by the campaigns for instance. 
 Additionally, further research is necessary to see if these results remain when looking 
into other countries. Opportunities exist to not only research into differences between anti-
malaria campaigns, but also campaigns across the globe with any goal to achieve. The 
availability of extensive data from the Demographic and Health Surveys and the others 
mentioned here make it easier to do these types of analyses, and a better understanding of 
differences in results across various organizations can help us make sure funding is used most 
efficiently and awarded to the most effective organizations.  
 More research is also needed to assess whether levels of funding are similar across 
campaigns. Of course, the purpose of this research was simply to test whether differences could 
be found. If the results are reliable, future research needs to dig into the various strategies and 
funding levels of these campaigns to see if we can discover the mechanisms through which 
different campaigns achieve different results.   
 Additionally, the outcome variable used here allowed for a simple econometric strategy, 
but other (and perhaps more important) outcomes should also be studied. For example, are 
there reductions in reported cases of fever or lower probabilities of death among pregnant 
women and children under 5? These are all important questions, and future work can hopefully 
provide some answers.  
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8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The fight against malaria has been going on for decades, with a major increase in 
attention over the last 15 years. Recent research has attempted to address topics such as 
which preventive behaviors are most effective at achieving desirable health outcomes, which 
policies are more likely to get people engaged in these key preventive behaviors, and even 
which preventative behaviors are the most cost effective. Nevertheless, in addition to the social, 
economic and medical perspectives looking into the fight, it’s possible that this problem can be 
studied from an organizational performance perspective. Perhaps some non-profit organizations 
operate more efficiently and effectively than their counterparts, and are more likely to succeed in 
achieving the goals shared by the international community. If this is the case (as this research 
seems to suggest) other organizations should begin trying to replicate what it is that the most 
effective ones are doing. Perhaps then we could ultimately learn how to save more lives with 
fewer resources.  
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ESSAY #2 TABLES 
Table 17A: Data Sources 
Year Source 
Number of 
Households 
Number of 
Children 
Under Five 
2003 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), Wave 4 5,292 14,475 
2008 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), Wave 5 24,272 70,089 
2010 Malaria Indicator Survey (MIS), Wave 6 4,557 13,877 
2011 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), Round 4 23,116 26,018 
2013 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), Wave 6 27,978 82,703 
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Table 18A: Campaigns by State and Year 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Abia    WB & NMCP  
Adamawa  UNICEF    
Akwa Ibom  
WB W/O 
NMCP 
   
Anambra 
WB W/O 
NMCP 
    
Bauchi  
WB W/O 
NMCP 
   
Bayelsa   WB & NMCP   
Benue   WB & NMCP   
Borno   WB & NMCP   
Cross river   Other NGOs   
Delta**     WB & NMCP* 
Ebonyi   GF NGOs   
Edo    WB & NMCP  
Ekiti Other NGOs     
Enugu   WB & NMCP   
FCT   WB & NMCP   
Gombe  
WB W/O 
NMCP 
   
Imo    WB & NMCP  
Jigawa  
WB W/O 
NMCP 
   
Kaduna  UNICEF    
Kano 
WB W/O 
NMCP 
    
Katsina  GF NGOs    
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Table 18A (continued): Campaigns by State and Year 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Kebbi UNICEF     
Kogi**     WB & NMCP* 
Kwara   WB & NMCP   
Lagos   WB & NMCP   
Nassarawa  UNICEF    
Niger GF NGOs     
Ogun GF NGOs     
Ondo    WB & NMCP  
Osun**     WB & NMCP* 
Oyo    WB & NMCP  
Oyo    WB & NMCP WB & NMCP* 
Plateau  GF NGOs    
Rivers  
WB W/O 
NMCP 
   
Sokoto UNICEF     
Taraba   WB & NMCP   
Yobe   WB & NMCP   
Zamfara   Other NGOs   
* These states’ campaigns were carried out following data collection in 2013. 
** These states create our baseline group.  
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Table 19A: Bed Net Ownership by State Over Time 
State 2003 2008 2010 2011 2013 
Abia .03 .04 .13 .16 .58 
Abuja .03 .15 .22 .49 .39 
Adamawa .13 .13 .82 .82 .74 
Akwa Ibom .05 .17 .70 .72 .48 
Anambra .03 .15 .79 .76 .59 
Bauchi .19 .23 .76 .82 .71 
Bayelsa .54 .22 .22 .29 .54 
Benue .12 .15 .11 .18 .74 
Borno .38 .53 .55 .50 .57 
Cross River .31 .27 .55 .71 .69 
Delta** .06 .13 .25 .28 .40 
Ebonyi .19 .25 .36 .45 .62 
Edo .11 .15 .14 .17 .65 
Ekiti .01 .15 .83 .63 .48 
Enugu .11 .10 .23 .14 .67 
Gombe .07 .28 .90 .86 .76 
Imo 0.0 .15 .23 .17 .80 
Jigawa .10 .32 .89 .80 .77 
Kaduna .02 .20 .78 .78 .36 
Kano .03 .12 .76 .61 .51 
Katsina .05 .05 .19 .77 .69 
Kebbi .43 .20 .75 .83 .64 
Kogi** .16 .15 .24 .30 .35 
Kwara .05 .15 .18 .29 .56 
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Table 19A (continued): Bed Net Ownership by State Over Time 
State 2003 2008 2010 2011 2013 
Lagos .01 .15 .15 .18 .58 
Nasarawa .15 .25 .47 .67 .63 
Niger .17 .11 .78 .75 .49 
Ogun .02 .09 .58 .47 .38 
Ondo .01 .18 .19 .11 .67 
Osun** 0.0 .04 .07 .15 .28 
Oyo 0.0 .04 .09 .17 .44 
Plateau .05 .20 .42 .79 .61 
Rivers .05 .16 .67 .63 .32 
Sokoto .46 .62 .74 .70 .60 
Taraba .24 .2 .34 .23 .65 
Yobe .14 .17 .64 .42 .63 
Zamfara .14 .12 .32 .18 .85 
** These states form our baseline group.  
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Table 20A: Bed Net Usage by State Over Time 
State 2003 2008 2010 2011 2013 
Abia .03 .02 .03 .04 .15 
Abuja .03 .05 0.0 .21 .18 
Adamawa .05 .04 .42 .12 .09 
Akwa Ibom .01 .08 .25 .17 .14 
Anambra .01 .11 .32 .16 .11 
Bauchi .04 .08 .45 .12 .05 
Bayelsa .12 .12 .06 .08 .20 
Benue .04 .09 .04 .04 .20 
Borno .06 .18 .3 .05 .08 
Cross River .16 .14 .24 .25 .24 
Delta** .02 .07 .13 .09 .08 
Ebonyi .11 .13 .16 .05 .21 
Edo .11 .07 .04 .04 .16 
Ekiti 0.0 .08 .13 .20 .13 
Enugu .05 .05 .06 .04 .20 
Gombe .02 .09 .51 .26 .09 
Imo 0.0 .08 .06 .02 .18 
Jigawa .08 .13 .53 .25 .20 
Kaduna 0.0 .08 .42 .25 .04 
Kano .01 .04 .36 .15 .05 
Katsina .01 .02 .06 .23 .16 
Kebbi .19 .08 .40 .08 .16 
Kogi** .07 .08 .10 .15 .10 
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Table 20A (continued): Bed Net Usage by State Over Time 
State 2003 2008 2010 2011 2013 
Kwara .02 .06 .01 .10 .18 
Lagos 0.0 .05 .07 .06 .16 
Nasarawa .03 .05 .06 .12 .12 
Niger .09 .01 .29 .09 .07 
Ogun 0.0 .05 .17 .11 .14 
Ondo 0.0 .08 .05 .03 .19 
Osun** 0.0 .01 0.0 .06 .05 
Oyo 0.0 .02 .02 .09 .13 
Plateau .01 .06 .17 .22 .15 
Rivers 0.0 .09 .33 .16 .10 
Sokoto .03 .22 .43 .14 .10 
Taraba .06 .05 .14 .04 .09 
Yobe .01 .05 .40 .07 .13 
Zamfara .01 .04 .09 .03 .07 
** These states form our baseline group.  
 
  
76 
 
Table 21A: OLS Estimates of Effects of Anti-malaria Campaigns on Net Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 HH Owns 
Mosquito Net 
HH Owns 
Mosquito Net 
HH Owns 
Mosquito Net 
Campaign  0.409*** 0.409*** 0.407*** 
(past 12 months) [0.38,0.44] [0.38,0.44] [0.37,0.44] 
    
Campaign  0.320*** 0.319*** 0.315*** 
(13-24 months ago) [0.29,0.35] [0.28,0.35] [0.27,0.36] 
    
Campaign  0.241*** 0.240*** 0.174*** 
(25-36 months ago) [0.19,0.29] [0.19,0.29] [0.10,0.25] 
    
Campaign  0.179*** 0.179*** 0.122** 
(>36 months ago) [0.12,0.24] [0.12,0.23] [0.034,0.21] 
    
Urban  -0.0670*** -0.0679*** 
  [-0.082,-0.052] [-0.083,-0.053] 
    
Has Electricity  0.0114** 0.0115** 
  [0.0028,0.020] [0.0029,0.020] 
    
No. of HH Members  0.00663*** 0.00647*** 
  [0.0049,0.0083] [0.0048,0.0082] 
    
No. of Women in HH  -0.0126*** -0.0122*** 
  [-0.018,-0.0073] [-0.017,-0.0069] 
    
No. of Children U5  0.0244*** 0.0241*** 
  [0.021,0.028] [0.021,0.028] 
    
Mother's Edu. Level  0.0306*** 0.0300*** 
  [0.025,0.037] [0.024,0.036] 
    
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
State Time Trend No No Yes 
R2 0.237 0.245 0.254 
Observations 85172 83627 83627 
95% confidence intervals in brackets; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 22A: OLS Estimates of Effects of Anti-malaria Campaigns on Net Ownership 
 HH Owns Mosquito Net 
WB & NMCP  0.419
***
 
(Within Past 12 Months) [0.33,0.51] 
WB & NMCP  0.293
***
 
(13-24 Months Ago) [0.21,0.38] 
WB & NMCP  0.0922 
(25-36 Months Ago) [-0.088,0.27] 
WB w/o NMCP  0.398
***
 
(Within Past 12 Months) [0.33,0.46] 
WB w/o NMCP  0.339
***
 
(13-24 Months Ago) [0.27,0.41] 
WB w/o NMCP  0.187
**
 
(25-36 Months Ago) [0.045,0.33] 
WB w/o NMCP  0.131
*
 
(>36 Months Ago) [0.023,0.24] 
UNICEF  0.350
***
 
(Within Past 12 Months) [0.27,0.43] 
UNICEF  0.321
***
 
(13-24 Months Ago) [0.16,0.48] 
UNICEF  0.0664 
(25-36 Months Ago) [-0.068,0.20] 
UNICEF  0.182 
(>36 Months Ago) [-0.069,0.43] 
GF NGOs  0.495
***
 
(Within Past 12 Months) [0.42,0.57] 
GF NGOs  0.333
***
 
(13-24 Months Ago) [0.22,0.45] 
GF NGOs  0.305
***
 
(25-36 Months Ago) [0.17,0.44] 
GF NGOs  0.0331 
(>36 Months Ago) [-0.17,0.24] 
Other NGOs  0.319
***
 
(Within Past 12 Months) [0.22,0.41] 
Other NGOs  0.232
***
 
(13-24 Months Ago) [0.14,0.33] 
Other NGOs 0.308
***
 
(25-36 Months Ago) [0.14,0.48] 
Other NGOs 0.0168 
(>36 Months Ago) [-0.12,0.16] 
Controls Yes 
State FE Yes 
Time FE Yes 
State Time Trend Yes 
R
2
 0.255 
Observations 83627 
95% confidence intervals in brackets; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
  
78 
 
 
Figure 3A: Net Ownership by Time Elapsed Since Any Campaign 
 
 
Figure 4A: Net Ownership by Campaign and Time Elapsed Since Campaign 
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Figure 5A: Net Ownership by Time Elapsed Since Campaign- GF NGOs 
  
 
Figure 6A: Net Ownership by Time Elapsed Since Campaign- WB & NMCP 
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Figure 7A: Net Ownership by Time Elapsed Since Campaign- WB w/o NMCP 
 
Figure 8A: Net Ownership by Time Elapsed Since Campaign- UNICEF 
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Figure 9A: Net Ownership by Time Elapsed Since Campaign- Other NGOs 
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Table 23A: OLS Estimates of Effects of Anti-malaria Campaigns on Net Usage for Children Under 5 
 (1) (2) 
Campaign  0.140*** 0.160*** 
(past 12 months) [0.131,0.150] [0.148,0.172] 
Campaign  0.090*** 0.096*** 
(13-24 months ago) [0.080,0.101] [0.081,0.111] 
Campaign  0.005 -0.017 
(25-36 months ago) [-0.007,0.018] [-0.037,0.003] 
Campaign  0.021** 0.024 
(>36 months ago) [0.008,0.035] [-0.002,0.050] 
Urban -0.005 -0.006* 
 [-0.010,0.000] [-0.012,-0.001] 
Has Electricity -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 [-0.009,-0.004] [-0.009,-0.004] 
No. of HH Members -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 [-0.005,-0.003] [-0.005,-0.003] 
No. of Women in HH -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 [-0.016,-0.010] [-0.016,-0.010] 
No. of Children U5 in HH 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 [0.015,0.019] [0.015,0.019] 
Mother's Edu. level 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 [0.015,0.020] [0.015,0.020] 
State FE Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
State Time Trend No Yes 
R2 0.054 0.059 
Observations 204945 204945 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Figure 10A: Net Usage by Time Elapsed Since Campaign 
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Table 24A: Effects of Anti-malaria Campaigns on Net Usage for Children Under 5 
 (1) (2) 
 Child Slept Under Net Child Slept Under Net 
WB & NMCP  0.110*** 0.147*** 
(Within Past 12 Months) [0.092,0.129] [0.119,0.175] 
WB & NMCP  0.086*** 0.096*** 
(13-24 Months Ago) [0.070,0.102] [0.070,0.121] 
WB & NMCP  -0.081*** -0.085*** 
(25-36 Months Ago) [-0.113,-0.049] [-0.132,-0.038] 
WB w/o NMCP  0.218*** 0.210*** 
(Within Past 12 Months) [0.196,0.241] [0.184,0.237] 
WB w/o NMCP  0.148*** 0.152*** 
(13-24 Months Ago) [0.128,0.168] [0.127,0.176] 
WB w/o NMCP  -0.005 -0.037 
(25-36 Months Ago) [-0.032,0.021] [-0.087,0.013] 
WB w/o NMCP  0.023** 0.043** 
(>36 Months Ago) [0.006,0.040] [0.012,0.074] 
UNICEF  0.200*** 0.211*** 
(Within Past 12 Months) [0.178,0.222] [0.183,0.239] 
UNICEF  -0.001 0.009 
(13-24 Months Ago) [-0.027,0.024] [-0.033,0.051] 
UNICEF  0.015 0.050** 
(25-36 Months Ago) [-0.004,0.033] [0.013,0.087] 
UNICEF  -0.018 0.012 
(>36 Months Ago) [-0.043,0.007] [-0.048,0.072] 
GF NGOs  0.220*** 0.247*** 
(Within Past 12 Months) [0.195,0.245] [0.219,0.274] 
GF NGOs  0.091*** 0.165*** 
(13-24 Months Ago) [0.069,0.114] [0.135,0.196] 
GF NGOs  0.114*** 0.154*** 
(25-36 Months Ago) [0.092,0.135] [0.119,0.188] 
GF NGOs  0.035** 0.169*** 
(>36 Months Ago) [0.012,0.059] [0.116,0.222] 
Controls  Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
State Time Trend No Yes 
R2 0.061 0.063 
Observations 204945 204945 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
GF NGOs represents NGOs funded by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
 
 
 
85 
 
 
Figure 11A: Net Usage by Campaign and Time Elapsed Since Campaign 
 
 
Figure 12A: Net Usage by Time Elapsed Since Campaign- GF NGOs 
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Figure 13A: Net Usage by Time Elapsed Since Campaign- WB & NMCP 
 
Figure 14A: Net Usage by Time Elapsed Since Campaign- WB w/o NMCP 
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Figure 15A: Net Usage by Time Elapsed Since Campaign- UNICEF 
 
Figure 16A: Net Usage by Time Elapsed Since Campaign- Other NGOs 
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APPENDIX: IRB APPROVAL CERTIFICATIONS 
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